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ABSTRACT
The First Amendment gives U.S. citizens a Hohfeldian legal immunity that disables Congress 
from removing citizens’ legal liberty to criticize the government. Any attempt by Congress to 
remove this liberty would fail, but such an attempt would still wrong citizens. The familiar 
concept of claim-violation does not fully account for this wrong. Claims name actions that ought 
not be performed and are violated when those actions are performed. Immunities names actions 
that cannot be performed. Congress would wrong citizens not by doing something it ought not do 
but by attempting and failing to do something it cannot do. Using elements of Jean Hampton’s 
expressive theory  of punishment, I analyze Congress’ attempt (and other similar acts) as an 
expressive act  that denies the existence of immunities. Congress’ immunity-“contradiction” 
would wrong U.S. citizens by  denying the value that generates the immunity, by  causing damage 
to the acknowledgement of the citizens’ value, and by threatening the existence of the immunity.
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INTRODUCTION
 On April 12 and April 14, 1963, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. held demonstrations in Birmingham, 
Alabama with fellow civil rights activists. In doing so, Dr. King flouted an Alabama circuit  court 
injunction to refrain from demonstrating in Birmingham without a parade permit, as required by a City of 
Birmingham ordinance. The City applied for a contempt  order. At the hearing Dr. King argued that  the 
court  injunction restrained free speech and that  the City ordinance, for the same reason, was 
unconstitutional. The case, Walker v. City of Birmingham, was eventually heard before the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1967, and the Court  affirmed the contempt order. In his analysis of the case, William Edmundson 
argues that the Court  made the correct  legal judgment even though Dr. King was clearly correct to point 
out that  the City’s ordinance restrained free speech and was therefore unconstitutional (Edmundson 1998, 
51).
 Rather than engage the details of Edmundson’s argument, I want to consider a question suggested 
by its conclusion. Given the plausible assumption that  Dr. King was wronged by the City when its 
ordinance restrained Dr. King’s free speech, where can we locate this wrong if the Court  was right to 
affirm the contempt order? One possible answer to this question could come from an analysis that showed 
how the City’s mere appeal to the ordinance wronged Dr. King. The analysis would run something like 
this. The First  Amendment  of the U.S. Constitution protected Dr. King by making it the case that  no 
legislative body—at the federal, state, county or city level—could give Dr. King a legal duty to refrain 
from enjoying freedom of speech. Any attempt  to give Dr. King such a duty would be a legal nullity. In 
the language of W. N. Hohfeld, the First Amendment  of the U.S. Constitution gave Dr. King a legal 
immunity against being given a legal duty to refrain from enjoying freedom of speech. When the City of 
Birmingham appealed to an ordinance that abridged the freedom of speech, declaring that the ordinance 
gave Dr. King a legal duty to refrain from exercising his freedom of speech by demonstrating with his 
fellows, the City wronged Dr. King. One might be tempted to argue that the City wronged Dr. King by 
giving him a legal duty to refrain from enjoying freedom of speech when the City should not have given 
Dr. King such a duty. In Hohfeldian terms, the City violated Dr. King’s claim against  them that they not 
give him a legal duty to refrain from enjoying free speech. But this cannot  be right, because the First 
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Amendment made it the case that the City could not give Dr. King such a duty. The conclusion that  the 
City failed to wrong Dr. King, since the City apparently failed to violate his claim, is not right  either. The 
aim of this essay is to give an analysis of immunities and wrongdoing that will, among other things, show 
how the City treated Dr. King’s immunity in such a way that it wronged him.
 The first chapter will describe the puzzle of immunity-violation more clearly, starting with 
exposition of Hohfeld’s taxonomy of legal relations (focusing on claims and immunities), defining 
violation and, finally, rejecting the idea that  all candidate cases of immunity-violation can be explained as 
cases of claim-violation. In the second chapter I introduce Jean Hampton’s expressive theory of 
punishment in order eventually to identify a way of treating Hohfeldian claims that  wrongs the claim-
holders without  violating their claims. I call this way of treating Hohfeldian claims “claim-contradiction.” 
Central to Hampton’s account are the Kantian idea that  to wrong a person is to disrespect  her by causing 
damage to her value and the idea that acts can have expressive meanings determined by social rules. I also 
introduce Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes’ analysis of expressive wrongdoing, according to which 
an act  that  expresses inappropriate attitudes about  a person’s value wrongs that  person whether or not it 
causes damage to her value. In chapter three I show how immunities can be contradicted and how 
immunity-contradiction wrongs immunity-holders; I also extend the completed analysis to legal claims 
and immunities, returning finally to Dr. King’s case.
 The following is a summary of the positive theses put  forward in this essay regarding the ways in 
which one can treat an immunity and thereby wrong the immunity-holder. Claim-violation is one of many 
expressive actions that  can constitute contradiction of a claim. Other expressive actions can constitute 
claim-contradiction; similar expressive actions can constitute immunity-contradiction. Of these claim- or 
immunity-contradictory expressive actions, some constitute denial of the value that  generates the claim or 
immunity, while others constitute denial of the importance of that  value. Such expressive actions wrong 
the claim- or immunity-holder regardless of their consequences. We can also understand these actions to 
wrong their victims by looking at  their effects, including damage to the acknowledgement  of the victim’s 
value or its importance. Expressive acts that  contradict  legal claims and immunities can wrong the claim- 
or immunity-holders by threatening the existence of the claims and immunities in question.
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CHAPTER 1: Claims, Immunities and Violation
In this chapter I begin with a distinction W. N. Hohfeld drew between claims and immunities. I 
will summarize William Edmundson’s (successful) attempt  to demonstrate our need for this distinction 
when explaining important  differences between kinds of legal relations that can obtain between people. 
Broadly speaking, my purpose in this essay is to ask how the difference between claims and immunities 
maps onto differences between ways of wronging people. Claim-violation is a way of treating a claim that 
wrongs the claim-holder. Is there a way of treating an immunity that  counts as immunity-violation and 
wrongs the immunity-holder? For various reasons that should become clear in this chapter, many will say 
that immunities, by definition, cannot be violated. On a strict  definition of violation (which I will accept 
for the purposes of this essay) they are correct. Aside from violation, then, is there a way of treating an 
immunity that wrongs the immunity-holder? If there is, what is the nature of the wrong done? At the end 
of this chapter, I will consider the possibility that  the answer to the former question is negative. I will try 
to dismiss this possibility. In the next chapter I will turn to the latter question.
1.1: Claims and Immunities
With the 1913 publication of his seminal work on legal relations, “Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning,” Hohfeld offered a way out  of the muddle legal 
professionals got themselves into when they assumed that all legal relations could be reduced to “rights” 
and “duties” (Hohfeld, 35). A number of meaningful distinctions could be drawn, he showed, between 
legal relations commonly called “rights” or “duties.” Without lingering too long on Hohfeld’s taxonomy, 
let  me briefly introduce the fundamental legal relations he identified and highlight a few features of their 
interrelations that are central to the argument elaborated below.
Hohfeld identified the following eight relations: claim, duty, no-claim, liberty, immunity, power, 
liability and disability. A Hohfeldian relation always involves two parties—a subject  and an object—and 
it always has a content, which concerns some action. Consider the following example.
1) Stanley has a claim against Leopold that Leopold pay Stanley 50,000 francs.
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In 1), Stanley is the subject of the claim-relation and Leopold is its object. Stanley has a claim against 
Leopold only if Leopold should5 perform the act named in the content of Stanley’s claim.6 We can more 
easily describe Stanley’s having a claim against Leopold when we examine another relation that  obtains 
between Stanley and Leopold: the duty-relation. The duty-relation is the correlative of the claim-relation. 
The subject of a claim-relation is always the object of its correlative duty-relation. The object of a claim-
relation is always the subject of its correlative duty-relation. Thus, 1) is true only if the following is also 
true.7
2) Leopold has a duty to Stanley that Leopold pay Stanley 50,000 francs.
Notice that both the relations are about an act  which Leopold should perform; indeed, both relations are 
about the same act. The act  these relations are about  is called the “content” of the relations. All correlative 
relations have the same content.8
 In addition to having a correlative, every relation has an opposite. This is just to say that we have 
special terms we use to describe the relations that obtain between Stanley and Leopold (to continue with 
the same example) when Stanley does not have a claim against Leopold and when Leopold does not have 
a duty to Stanley. When Stanley does not have a claim against  Leopold, we say that Stanley has a no-
claim on Leopold; when Leopold does not have a duty to Stanley, we say that Leopold has a liberty 
4
5 This is a somewhat simplistic description of the claim-relation that ignores some of the difficulties that arise in 
cases of rights conflict. In some cases, it may be sensible to say that Stanley has a claim against Leopold that 
Leopold do A but that it is nevertheless false that Leopold should (all things considered) do A. I do not address cases 
of rights conflict in this essay and have chosen to ignore certain difficulties to ease exposition. For one treatment of 
the problem of rights conflict, see Rainbolt 2006, Chapter 6.
6 Claim-relations can be described as positive or negative, depending on the nature of the act named in the content of 
the claim-relation. Stanley’s claim named in 1) is most straightforwardly described as a positive claim—a claim that 
Leopold do A. If, instead, Stanley had a claim against Leopold that Leopold not divulge certain information about 
Stanley’s activities, then Stanley’s claim is most straightforwardly described as a negative claim—a claim that 
Leopold not do A. For the purposes of this essay, I will say that all claims most straightforwardly described as 
positive claims can be redescribed as negative claims. So, Stanley’s claim that Leopold pay 50,000 francs can be 
redescribed as a claim that Leopold not neglect to pay Stanley 50,000 francs. Likewise, claims most 
straightforwardly described as negative claims can all be redescribed as positive claims.
7 Rainbolt agrees that all claims have correlative duties, but he argues that some duties (like the duty of charity) do 
not have correlative claims, that some duties are, in other words, “non-relational” (Rainbolt, 131-133). Such duties 
are also sometimes called “imperfect” (Edmundson, 99). If Rainbolt is right (and I think he clearly is, at least in the 
case of legal duties), then 1) and 2) are not inter-entailing. Rather, 1) is true only if 2) is true and 2) is true if 1) is 
true. As Edmundson points out, it is difficult to tell what Hohfeld himself would have thought of the idea of non-
relational duties (Edmundson 2004, 99).
8 Edmundson points out (Edmundson 2004, 95) that Hohfeld’s analysis of rights conflicts with the idea that all rights 
are, fundamentally, rights against interference. Rather, duties correlative to claim-rights can be duties to perform 
some act that cannot be satisfactorily described as an act of refraining from interference.
against Stanley. Unsurprisingly, no-claims and liberties are correlative relations, and each has the same 
content as its opposite—namely, in this case, that Leopold pay Stanley 50,000 francs.
 The structure of the remaining four relations—immunities, powers, liabilities and disabilities—is 
similar to the structure of the first four relations. These remaining relations have subjects and objects, and 
they are about  some act. However, they are not about  acts like paying someone 50,000 francs. The 
remaining four relations are always about  an act that might or might  not  change some other relation. For 
this reason, they are called second-order relations, while the first four relations are called first-order 
relations. Consider the following example of a second-order relation.
3) Stanley has an immunity with respect  to Leopold that Leopold not change “Stanley has a claim 
against Leopold that  Leopold pay Stanley 50,000 francs” into “Stanley has a no-claim on Leopold 
that Leopold pay Stanley 50,000 francs” by saying, “Stanley, I don’t have to pay you.”
Stanley is the subject of this immunity, and Leopold is its object. The content  of the immunity is 
Leopold’s changing Stanley’s claim (what we call the “original relation”) into a no-claim (what  we call 
the “resulting relation”). The act  that might or might not cause this change to happen is called the 
“triggering act.” Stanley has this immunity if and only if Leopold’s performing the triggering act named 
cannot bring about the change named.
 As one might expect, all second-order relations have correlatives and opposites, just as do first-
order relations. Thus, 3) is true only if the following is also true.9
4) Leopold has a disability with respect  to Stanley that  Leopold not change “Stanley has a claim 
against Leopold that  Leopold pay Stanley 50,000 francs” into “Stanley has a no-claim on Leopold 
that Leopold pay Stanley 50,000 francs” by saying, “Stanley, I don’t have to pay you.”
Disabilities and immunities are correlative relations; they both obtain when a certain change cannot  be 
brought about  by a certain triggering act. The opposite of an immunity is a liability. That is, Stanley does 
not have an immunity with respect  to Leopold if and only if he has a liability with respect to Leopold. 
Leopold does not have a disability with respect  to Stanley if and only if he has a power with respect  to 
Stanley. Liabilities and powers are correlative relations; they both express the fact  that  a certain change 
can be brought about by a certain triggering act.
5
9 I write that 3) is true only if 4) is also true because I assume that there are non-relational disabilities, just as there 
are non-relational duties. This is not a question I will get into here. If there are no non-relational disabilities, then it 
would be more complete to write that 3) is true if and only if 4) is true.
 It  may be helpful, at this point, to reproduce versions10 of the tables Hohfeld used to summarize 
the eight  legal relations he identified and their interrelations. In the first  table, each relation named in the 
first  row is paired with its correlative relation, just  below. In the second table, each relation named in the 
first row is paired with its opposite relation, just below.
Figure 1.1: Hohfeldian correlatives Figure 1.2: Hohfeldian opposites
claim liberty power immunity claim liberty power immunity
duty no-claim liability disability no-claim duty disability liability
 
 In the analysis that follows, I will follow other legal philosophers in using Hohfeld’s taxonomy of 
legal relations to investigate not  only legal claims and immunities but also moral claims and immunities.11 
There are certain difficulties in using Hohfeld’s taxonomy in this way, but  I believe my analysis avoids 
them.12
1.2: Edmundson on Immunities
Edmundson shows us that  the right to free speech protected by the U.S. Constitution cannot  be 
satisfactorily analyzed without the concept of immunity (see Edmundson, 2004, 88-91). I will return to 
the Dr. King example in Chapter 3; for now I will use the more general example Edmundson uses to make 
his case. Suppose Congress passes a law criminalizing speech that expresses disrespect for the U.S. 
Government—what we might call the “Anti-Sedition Act.” We can understand this as wronging U.S. 
citizens in some way. But  how should we understand this wrong? We might  at  first be inclined to say that 
6
10 Hohfeld used the terms “right”, “no-right” and “privilege” where I have used “claim”, “no-claim” and “liberty”, 
respectively. In using these alternate terms, I follow Rainbolt (and many other legal philosophers), who find that the 
alternate terms more clearly identify the relations Hohfeld was interested in. Hohfeld’s original tables can be found 
on Hohfeld, 36.
11 Edmundson notes: “Although Hohfeld was concerned solely with the analysis of legal rights, the opinion of moral 
philosophers has generally been that his work reveals most, though not all, of the fundamental logical 
interconnections and relationships of moral rights, as well as of legal rights” (Edmundson 2004, 94). For such an 
opinion, see Wellman 1985, 17 sqq. and Wellman 1995, 38 sqq. I do not mean to endorse the thesis that, in principle, 
moral rights are best explained through an extension of our analysis of legal rights—a thesis Raz (254) seems to 
attribute (perhaps wrongly) to Wellman—but rather the much weaker thesis that, as a matter of fact, Hohfeld’s 
analysis of legal relations gives us terms that we can use to adequately individuate at least some important moral 
relations that we should and do call rights.
12 For a helpful overview of some of these problems, see Edmundson on “duties not to” and “duties that”, legal and 
moral interference, duties’ entailing claims, and group and individual rights (Edmundson 2004, 94-102).
Congress’ passing the Anti-Sedition Act violates a legal claim U.S. citizens have, created by the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, that  Congress not pass laws “abridging the freedom of speech.”13 
That is, we might  understand the first amendment  to make it the case that Congress ought not abridge the 
freedom of speech by passing laws like the Anti-Sedition Act. Edmundson shows that this is not  in fact 
what the first amendment  does. If Congress passes the Anti-Sedition Act, would it give U.S. citizens a 
legal duty to not speak disrespectfully of the U.S. Government? In other words, should we say that 
although Congress ought not abridge the freedom of speech by passing the Anti-Sedition Act, it 
nevertheless can make it  illegal to speak disrespectfully of the U.S. Government  by passing the Act? The 
correct analysis, according to Edmundson, shows that  this is not  the case. Passing the Anti-Sedition Act 
does not make it  illegal to speak disrespectfully of the U.S. Government because the First Amendment 
prevents the Anti-Sedition Act from ever becoming law in the first place. The Anti-Sedition Act is a legal 
nullity. In Hohfeldian terms, the first  amendment makes it the case that Congress lacks the legal power to 
give U.S. citizens a duty to not  speak disrespectfully of the U.S. Government by passing an act  like the 
Anti-Sedition Act. Congress has a disability with respect to creating such a duty, therefore; and U.S. 
citizens have an immunity with respect  to Congress’ turning their liberty to speak disrespectfully of the 
government into a duty to not speak disrespectfully of the government.
Edmundson shows that  we need the concept of immunity to understand the right to free speech 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. As to how we can understand the wrong that Congress does when it 
passes the Anti-Sedition Act, however, Edmundson remains silent. There are two separate questions that 
need to be answered. One has to do with the nature of Congress’ treatment  of the immunity: Does 
Congress “violate” U.S. citizens’ legal immunities if it passes such a law, in the same way that it  could 
violate citizens’ legal claims if it performed some other act? The second question has to do with the nature 
of the wrong done the citizens through the Congress’ treatment  of the immunity: Does such “violation” 
wrong citizens in the same way that  the violation of a legal claim would? In the following section I will 
show that certain aspects of Congress’ treatment  of claims it violates cannot apply in the case of 
7
13 The full text of the Amendment reads:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for redress of grievances.” (U.S. Const. am. 1)
immunities. This raises a terminological question about the use of “violation” that is easily set aside. 
Showing that immunities cannot be violated (on a certain strict definition of violation) does little to 
advance the analysis. In Chapter 2 I begin identifying a way of treating immunities that  wrongs the 
immunity-holders and begin explaining how this way of treating immunities wrongs the immunity-
holders.
1.3: Immunity-“Violation”
On some understandings of violation, any assertion about the violation of an immunity will 
appear paradoxical. Such understandings of violation take as paradigm cases instances of claim-violation. 
By definition, if you have a claim against me, then I should not do certain things. It might  make it the case 
that I should not drive your car without your permission, for example. The claim imposes normative 
limits on my actions; I violate your claim, on this view, when I disobey or disregard the normative limits 
your claim imposes on my actions—in this case, by driving your car without  your permission. The 
paradigm case of violation, then, is one where the party holding the duty correlative to a claim fails to 
discharge the duty, doing what she should not do.14  This analysis of violation is difficult  to apply to 
immunities.
Immunities, like claims, can be thought  of as imposing normative limits.15 The normative limits 
immunities impose, however, are reminiscent of the limits imposed on us by physical laws. Much as I 
might  like to fly about  the city on my own power as could Superman, the law of gravity (in conjunction 
with various other natural laws) prevents me from doing so. Similarly, although the U.S. Congress might 
like to impose a duty on U.S. citizens to not  speak disrespectfully of the U.S. Government—and, indeed, 
8
14 Violation can, in certain contexts, be helpfully distinguished from infringement, where both are doing what a 
claim makes it the case one should not do but the latter is permissible and the former not. See Judith Jarvis Thomson 
for such a distinction, or Jeff McMahan, 10. Examination of the implications of such a distinction for the analysis I 
give here could prove fruitful; but I will not pursue that examination here.
15 Indeed, this fact is central to Rainbolt’s justified-constraint theory of rights, according to which both and only 
claims and immunities count as rights. My thinking about immunity-”violation” is heavily indebted to Rainbolt and 
to his account, and I believe Rainbolt could use my analysis to defend his account against the charge that immunities 
are not rights because they cannot be violated, but I do not want to explicitly endorse or reject Rainbolt’s central 
argument about rights. I offer a partial endorsement of Rainbolt’s idea of immunity-violation, and I later use what 
Rainbolt calls the “key argument form” in elaborating my account of immunity-“violation” (or, as I call it, 
immunity-contradiction).
might  convince itself that  it  has imposed such a duty—U.S. citizens’ immunities (granted by the First 
Amendment) impose limits on Congress that  render it  incapable of imposing that  duty on them. Both 
immunities and claims impose normative limits. However, whereas we can, with some ease, speak of the 
violation of a claim—whose limits make it  the case that  its object should not do something—it  is more 
difficult to say exactly what we might  mean when we speak of the violation of an immunity—whose 
limits make it the case that its object cannot do something.
The difficulty of generating an adequate account of the violation of immunities is brought  out 
more clearly when we try to extend the parallel drawn above between immunities and physical laws. 
Every now and then we make an observation that  does not  fit with our understanding of the laws of 
physics. Upon making such an observation, we are forced to confront a contradiction: this cannot happen 
(according to our understanding of the laws of physics) and yet  it has happened. In such cases, it  is 
sometimes unclear which to trust, our understanding of the laws of physics or our observations, but  the 
issue is almost  always resolved in one of two ways: either we decide our observation was inaccurate or 
we decide our understanding of the laws of physics was inadequate. If the observation persists (over many 
cases), it  becomes difficult to conclude that the observation was inaccurate, and we are pressed to 
conclude that  what had appeared to be a violation of the laws of physics was not a violation at  all, but 
instead, the laws of physics are not as we originally thought.
Contrast this resolution with our response to the “violation” of an immunity. Lawyers do not 
usually conclude, when confronted with a case of immunity-violation, that they had been mistaken to 
believe that the immunity existed in the first place. Edmundson, for example, acknowledges the immunity 
generated by the First  Amendment and argues that the immunity would make the Anti-Sedition Act a legal 
nullity. If Congress passes the Anti-Sedition Act, we do not conclude that we were mistaken to think the 
First Amendment  grant U.S. citizens an immunity against  Congress giving them a duty to refrain from 
speaking disrespectfully of the U.S. government. Of course, neither do lawyers conclude that the act of 
violation therefore never occurred, or that  it was inaccurately reported. Edmundson still acknowledges 
that the Anti-Sedition Act  would have been “passed”, in some empty sense, and would be, in a very real 
sense, cause for a strong response. So lawyers speak as if the immunity persists, and they say that an act 
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has been committed that has wronged the immunity-holder. Edmundson’s analysis might be summarized 
as follows: Congress may say that  U.S. citizens now have a duty not to speak disrespectfully of the U.S. 
Government, but  in fact, U.S. citizens still have the liberty to speak disrespectfully, because they have an 
immunity to Congress’ annulling of that liberty; and Congress has wronged them by stating, falsely, that 
they no longer possess the liberty in question.
We are driven, therefore, to break from the analogy with physical laws. We observe a distinction 
between physical limits and normative limits. Physical limits determine, for any given physical action, 
what physical effects are possible. Normative limits of the sort imposed by immunities, on the other hand, 
determine, for any given physical action, what normative effects are possible. Although we rarely think 
we have achieved physical effects that  are, in fact, impossible to achieve in the circumstances, we quite 
frequently think that we have achieved normative effects that  are, in fact, impossible to achieve in the 
circumstances. We rarely convince ourselves that  we have achieved self-powered flight; it  is easy, on the 
other hand, to think of examples where people think they have created legal relations, for instance, which 
they have failed to create.
If by “violation” we just mean, “action by which one oversteps normative limits imposed on 
oneself,” then we see that  violation of an immunity is impossible. U.S. citizens’ immunity places limits on 
what normative effects Congress can achieve through its actions—it cannot  impose on U.S. citizens a 
duty to not  speak disrespectfully of the government. Congress literally cannot overstep the limits imposed 
by the immunity. The above definition of violation may be too narrow. The important  point, however, is 
that lawyers, lawmakers and philosophers clearly think there is something one can  do to immunities that 
wrongs the immunity-holders. Whatever we call that something is beside the point. Lacking a better term, 
for the moment, I will use the term “immunity-violation” to refer to whatever it is one can do to an 
immunity that wrongs the immunity-holder. We have seen that immunity-violation is not like the violation 
of a physical law; we have also seen that  it  is not  like the violation of a claim. What, then, is the nature of 
immunity-violation?
George Rainbolt  suggests that  a person violates another’s immunity if she performs the triggering 
act  mentioned in the immunity (the triggering act that cannot change the original relation into the 
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resulting relation) and then asserts that  the triggering act has changed the original relation into the 
resulting relation (Rainbolt, 44 and 45). This explanation is intuitively plausible. Much more can be said, 
however, about the nature of this act of immunity-violation, as a way of treating an immunity and as a 
way of wronging the immunity-holder. The account  I offer below tries to develop Rainbolt’s explanation 
in these ways. It  rejects, however, the idea that immunity-violation necessarily involves performing the 
triggering act mentioned in the immunity. The questions to answer are the following:
1) What way of treating an immunity wrongs its holder?
2) What kind of wrong is done to the immunity-holder when the immunity is treated in that way?
The first  question can be understood to ask for a way of treating an immunity that is in some way 
analogous to claim-violation. The second question can be understood to ask how this way of treating an 
immunity wrongs the immunity-holder. The argument that  begins in the second chapter does two things. It 
introduces Jean Hampton’s analysis of the expressive meaning of wrongdoing and from it  develops the 
notion of contradiction. Immunity-contradiction, I will suggest in the third chapter, is a way of treating an 
immunity that wrongs the immunity-holder. I will borrow a formal framework from Rainbolt to make 
more systematic the application of Hampton’s analysis to the case of immunities.
1.4: Claim-reductionism: An Alternative Analysis
Some might  suggest  that the search for a way of treating immunities analogous to claim-violation 
is misguided. If we think more creatively about how the concept of claim-violation applies to the cases we 
have considered, the objection could press, we will begin to see that  there is no need to look beyond the 
concept of claim-violation: every aspect  of every case of supposed immunity-violation can be thoroughly 
explained with the concept  of claim-violation. Congress’ passing the Anti-Sedition Act does wrong U.S. 
citizens because it treats their legal immunities in a certain way, but we need say no more than that U.S. 
citizens have a legal claim against Congress that Congress not treat their immunities in that way. So, 
Congress (knowingly or unknowingly) acts as if U.S. citizens’ free speech immunity does not exist—for 
now, I will refer to this treatment  of the immunity as disregard of the immunity—and Congress has a duty 
not to disregard U.S. citizens’ free speech immunity. The argument here is something like the following. 
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Suppose I have an apple and a claim against  you that  you not take my apple, touch it  or mutilate it in any 
way. If you smash my apple with a hammer, you have certainly treated the apple in a way that  wrongs me, 
but this is merely because the apple is something about which I have a claim. To say that  there is some 
special kind of wrong done me through the treatment of my immunities is like saying there is some 
special kind of wrong done me through the treatment  of my apple. Just as we need no concept of apple-
violation, so we need no concept of immunity-violation.
This objection, which I will call the claim-reductionist objection, is theoretically implausible. 
Suppose, again, that  Stanley has a claim (claimI) that Leopold give Stanley 50,000 francs. Suppose, 
further, that  claimI is “protected” by an immunity (immunityI) that  makes it  impossible for Leopold to get 
rid of claimI by saying something like, “Stanley, you no longer have claimI.” The claim-reductionist 
suggests that  Stanley has a further claim (claimII) against  Leopold that Leopold not  disregard Stanley’s 
immunity—that he not act as if he can get rid of Stanley’s claimI. It  is the violation of claimII, the claim-
reductionist  suggests, that  explains how Leopold wrongs Stanley if Leopold disregards immunityI. Now, it 
seems to me that the claim-reductionist would be quite willing to posit  the existence of another immunity, 
immunityII, that protects claimII. Without the protection of immunityII Leopold could easily get  rid of 
claimII  and he would no longer be wronging Stanley if he disregarded immunityI by acting as if he can 
get rid of Stanley’s claim. This would conflict with out  intuitions about the (normal) moral requirements 
of owing someone money. But if Stanley has immunityII, surely Leopold’s disregarding it would also 
wrong Stanley. Leopold could say, perhaps, that he has gotten rid of Stanley’s claimII against Leopold’s 
disregarding immunityI. The only way the claim-reductionist  can explain why this wrongs Stanley is to 
posit yet another claim, claimIII, against  Leopold’s disregarding immunityII. We would likely assume that 
there is then another new immunity protecting that claim (immunityIII), and a new claim against 
disregarding that new immunity (claimIV), and a new immunity protecting that new claim (immunityIV), 
and so on, ad infinitum. It is an open question whether such an infinite regress is vicious or not; but the 
claim-reductionist seems to carry at least an equal share of the burden of proof.
The analysis I offer in the following chapters is not so suggestive of an infinite regress. I aim to 
provide a rather direct way of understanding how certain ways of treating immunities wrong the 
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immunity-holders—without appealing to claims about immunities, or immunities about claims about 
immunities—and I should be able to show how my analysis accommodates various intuitions and 
considered opinions about real cases of wrongdoing. I will look at Hampton’s murder example. 
Eventually I will return to the Anti-Sedition Act and the Dr. King example offered in the Introduction.
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CHAPTER 2: Moral Injury, Denial and Contradiction
 In this chapter I introduce Jean Hampton’s analysis of expressive wrongdoing, I adopt  weakened 
versions of several of her theses, and I suggest that  we must look beyond her consequentialist  conception 
of moral injury in order to identify another important form of expressive wrongdoing. Hampton’s analysis 
deepens our understanding of claim-violation as wrongdoing by showing us how claim-violation causes 
moral injury; furthermore, her analysis makes it  is easy to see how one can separate claim-violation from 
other elements in the cause chain for moral injury, namely claim-contradiction. Claim-contradiction, I will 
argue, need not cause moral injury in order to constitute expressive wrongdoing; rather, claim-
contradiction can constitute another, direct form of wrongdoing. In the next  chapter I will show how the 
analysis of these two ways of wronging through claim-contradiction can translate into an analysis of two 
ways of wronging through immunity-contradiction, and I will identify a third way of wronging someone 
through immunity-contradiction.
2.1: Hampton and the Expressive Meaning of Wrongdoing
 In the 1988 articulation of her expressive theory of punishment, Hampton proposed that “part of 
what it is to view an act as immoral is to have the desire to reassert the victim’s value through 
punishment” (Hampton 1988, 132).16 We find here the idea that to view an act  as immoral is, among other 
things, to have some view about what  would be an appropriate response to the wrongful act. When 
attempting to distinguish types of wrongdoing, as I am, it  can be informative, therefore, to consider 
arguments for different  responses to wrongdoing. Such arguments attempt to show why a given response 
“fits” a particular wrongful act. They articulate a view not  only of the nature of the response to the 
wrongful act  but also of the nature of the wrongful act itself. I aim to identify a way of treating an 
immunity that  wrongs the immunity-holder. I propose to identify this type of wrongdoing by examining 
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16 See Hampton’s “The retributive idea,” Chapter 4 in Murphy, Jeffrie and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Hampton initially defended but then rejected the idea that the 
victim’s value can only be reasserted through punishment, eventually holding that there are non-punitive forms of 
retribution that can serve the same function See pp 1685-1698 of Hampton’s “Correcting Harms Versus Righting 
Wrongs” (UCLA Law Review, vol. 39, no. 6 (1992); 1659-1702).
one kind of response to wrongdoing, namely, retributive punishment. Jean Hampton has made a 
compelling case for understanding retributive punishment as a fitting response to wrongful acts that  cause 
what she calls “moral injury.” Hampton’s analysis of moral injury will help identify ways of treating 
claims that wrong the claim-holders but  do not involve violation and are also (I will show in the next 
chapter) ways of treating immunities that wrong the immunity-holders.
 Retributive punishment is punishment  justified by its retributive function. There is some 
disagreement  about whether punishment can be justified by other functions or even if it  has other 
functions. To put  the idea of retributive punishment  in context, however, I will name a few other functions 
that have been attributed to punishment, rightly or wrongly. Punishment’s function is often described with 
reference to wrongdoers or would-be wrongdoers: punishment  can serve to rehabilitate actual 
wrongdoers17 and can have a deterrent  effect  on would-be wrongdoers.18 At  other times, the function of 
punishment is described with reference to the victims of wrongdoing. Corrective punishment is said to 
have this sort  of function when it imposes upon a wrongdoer a duty to compensate her victim for material 
damage. Corrective punishment  imposes such a duty on a wrongdoer with the goal of repairing material 
damage done to the victim, restoring the victim to the material state she would have been in had the 
wrong not been done.19
 Hampton argues that at least part  of the function of retributive punishment, like corrective 
punishment, is repairing damage done to the victim of a wrong (Hampton 1992, 1698). However, whereas 
corrective punishment  aims at  repairing material damage (Hampton 1992, 1663), retributive punishment 
aims at  repairing what  Hampton calls moral injury (Hampton 1992, 1666). Moral injury, in contrast to 
material damage, is damage to the victim’s value caused by certain expressive acts (Hampton 1992, 
1679). Retributive punishment  repairs moral injury by vindicating the value of the victim (Hampton 1992, 
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17 For an analysis of such a concept of punishment’s function, see Jean-Christophe Merle’s German Idealism and the 
Concept of Punishment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
18 Jeremy Bentham famously emphasized punishment’s function as a deterrent. See Volume 4 of The Works of 
Jeremy Bentham (ed. John Bowring, London, 1838-1843, Reprinted by the University of Michigan Library, 2009).
19 Hampton 1992, 1661, citing Coleman’s Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
1686). In developing this argument, Hampton can be seen to follow G. W. F. Hegel, who famously 
claimed that punishment “annuls the crime.”20
 Hampton’s analysis of the fit  between retribution and moral injury is fascinating and important. I 
set this analysis aside, however, because I am not  concerned with arguing for or against any particular 
response to wrongful acts. I introduce Hampton’s analysis in order to extract  from it  the analysis of the 
sort of wrongful acts to which Hampton argues retributive punishment is an appropriate response, viz., 
wrongful acts that  cause moral injury. I will suggest that  a number of acts can cause moral injury. The 
violation of claims can cause moral injury; so can what I will call the “contradiction” of claims. 
Immunity-contradiction is a way of treating an immunity that causes moral injury to the immunity-holder 
and is, in that sense, analogous to claim-violation.
2.2: The Concept of Moral Injury Introduced
 I will first more thoroughly set out Hampton’s concept of moral injury and then turn to the 
problem of identifying the acts that  cause moral injury. Hampton’s concept of moral injury is built  on two 
fundamental theoretical endorsements. First, she endorses a Kantian conception of human value according 
to which all humans have equal value in virtue of their humanity (Hampton 1992, 1667). Second, she 
endorses a Gricean understanding of human behavior as expressive (Hampton 1992, 1669, 1670).21 Some 
expressive acts, Hampton writes, diminish a person’s value. Moral injury is caused by these expressive 
acts.22 To diminish a person’s value, for Hampton, is not to degrade (reduce the value of) the person—a 
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20 See Hegel’s Philosophy of right (S. W. Dyde trans. Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1996). Cited and quoted in 
Hampton 1988 on pages 114 and 131. For an analysis of the Hegelian elements of Hampton’s theory, see Farnham’s 
“A Hegelian Theory of Retribution” (Journal of Social Philosophy, 39 (4), Dec. 2008).
21 Hampton references Grice’s “Logic and Conversation” and “Meaning”, Chapters 2 and 14 in his Studies in the 
Way of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).
22 At some points Hampton claims that diminishment causes moral injury: “it is diminishment that causes moral 
injury, in one of two ways” (Hampton, 1992, 1676). At other points she claims that diminishment constitutes moral 
injury: “I will argue that diminishment is the normal result of an immoral act and that which constitutes moral injury 
inflicted by a wrongdoing. It is therefore the damage or ‘loss of value’ that wrongdoing inflicts” (Hampton 1992, 
1673). I take this apparent inconsistency to be the result of the ambiguous nature of the term “diminishment”, which 
can refer either to a state of being diminished or to a process of becoming (or making become) diminished. In the 
first quote Hampton seems to have in mind diminishment as process; in the second quote she seems to have in mind 
diminishment as state. In this essay, I will use “diminishment” to refer to diminishment-as-process. To refer to 
diminishment-as-state, I use Hampton’s phrase “appearance of degradation.” I will argue in 2.3.3 below that 
Hampton would do best to understand diminishment-as-state (appearance of degradation) as causing rather than 
constituting moral injury.
Kantian conception of human value would not allow such a result—but  rather to create the appearance of 
her degradation (Hampton 1992, 1673). The appearance of a person’s degradation, on Hampton’s account, 
seems to be the appearance that the person is worth less than she is actually worth.23 For Hampton, the 
following are different ways of saying the same thing: to diminish a person, to create the appearance of a 
person’s degradation, and to cause a person moral injury.24
 To help explicate the concept of diminishment Hampton offers the following analogy. Consider a 
valuable artistic object  like the Book of Kells. That the Book of Kells has a certain value “implies that 
only certain kinds of treatment are appropriate for it” (Hampton, 1992, 1674). In other words, the value of 
the object “generates certain entitlements” for the object—that it  not  be burned, for example, or torn to 
pieces (Hampton, 1992, 1674, original emphasized).25  Someone who intentionally disregards these 
entitlements and treats the object in an inappropriate way—by burning it, say—is “denying that  the object 
really has [the] value [that  it  has], because he is denying the entitlements which that  value 
generates” (Hampton, 1992, 1674). Denying that  the Book of Kells has the value that  it  has is what 
creates the appearance of the Book’s degradation—it is what  diminishes the Book’s value. Acts that 
diminish a person’s value, on Hampton’s account, follow a similar pattern. They disregard the 
entitlements of the person and thereby deny that  the person has the value that  generates the entitlements. 
This denial diminishes the person, causing her moral injury.
 Hampton argues that  there are two kinds of moral injury: 1) damage to the realization of the 
victim’s value and 2) damage to the acknowledgement  of the victim’s value (Hampton 1992, 1678 and 
1679). Put simply, a person sustains the first  kind of moral injury when she is prevented from doing, 
having or being what  she is entitled to do, have or be. This kind of damage, for Hampton, is done through 
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23 At least on my reading, Hampton does not understand appearance of someone’s degradation to mean the 
appearance that someone has become less valuable.
24 I understand Hampton to hold that all moral injury is caused by diminishment—i.e. that there are no other causes 
of moral injury other than diminishment. I will not defend any particular view of this issue, but I am inclined to 
think that there are ways of causing moral injury that do not involve diminishment. Moreover, Hampton appears to 
hold that all wrongful acts are wrongful because they cause moral injury. Here too, I will not defend any particular 
view. It is enough, for my purposes, that some wrongful acts are wrongful because they cause moral injury. I am 
only looking for one way of treating immunities that wrongs immunity-holders.
25 Many find it odd, or worse, to say that an object has entitlements. In using Hampton’s example I do not mean to 
take a stand on the problem of objects’ capacity to have rights; I use Hampton’s example simply for its (not 
inconsiderable) explanatory power.
harm that  results from a wrongful act, where harm is defined as “a disruption of or interference in a 
person’s well-being, including damage to that  person’s body, psychological state, capacities to function, 
life plans, or resources over which we take this person to have an entitlement” (Hampton 1992, 1662). A 
first  approximation understanding of the second kind of moral injury is relatively self-evident. Damage to 
the acknowledgement  of a person’s value can be done by an act  that has no harmful effects (where harm 
is defined as above). I will have more to say about this second kind of moral injury in a moment.
I reproduce the gruesome example Hampton uses to illustrate the application of her analysis. The 
example is of a white farmer who causes moral injury to a black farmhand and his four sons.
 When one day the farmhand did something that enraged the farmer, the farmer apprehended him 
and his four sons, put them in large burlap bags, hung the bags holding the men to a tree, and 
began burning them. Before he was burned, one of the men asked for a cigar. The farmer 
answered him by using a knife to slit the bag holding him, cutting off the man’s penis, and then 
sticking it in his mouth, saying “Here, smoke that.” (Hampton 1992, 1675)
The farmhand and his sons had entitlements to not be burned and to not be mutilated. The farmer 
disregarded these entitlements. Because of the meaning relevant social rules assign to the acts of burning 
a person in a bag, cutting off a man’s penis and treating the penis as if it  were not a sexual organ, the 
farmer’s acts amounted to denial of the value of the farmhand and his sons (as persons) that generated 
their entitlements. In denying the value of the farmhand and his sons, the farmer diminished them (created 
the appearance of their degradation) and caused them moral injury. The farmhand and his sons sustained 
both kinds of moral injury named above. The farmhand and his sons sustained damage to the realization 
of their value (the first kind of moral injury) when they were prevented from securing what  their value as 
persons entitled them to secure—their autonomy, their bodily integrity, their possession of property and 
their lives. The farmhand and his sons also sustained damage to the acknowledgement  of their value (the 
second kind of moral injury). The farmer’s acts encouraged other people—other white farmers, other 
black farmhands and even the victims themselves—to believe that the farmhand and his sons lacked the 
value of persons that  generates entitlements to autonomy, bodily integrity and so forth. Notice that this 
moral injury could have been inflicted even if the farmer had not harmed the farmhand and his sons. 
Suppose, for example, that  the farmer had not burned the farmhand and his sons but instead had spat  on 
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them in full view of other farmers and farmhands. The farmer’s act, though minimally harmful, would 
have resulted in significant damage to the acknowledgement of the victims’ value.
 In what  follows, I focus solely on moral injury as damage to the acknowledgement of a person’s 
value. I will continue to use Hampton’s example of the farmer’s burning and mutilating the farmhands. 
The farmer’s actions caused both kinds of moral injury; I will focus on the way in which the actions 
caused the first  kind of moral injury—damage to the acknowledgement  of the farmhands’ value. I will 
identify a way of treating claims and immunities that causes this kind of moral injury without  violation. It 
may be possible to show how this way of treating claims and immunities causes the first kind of moral 
injury—damage to the realization of a person’s value—but the more limited demonstration is sufficient 
for my purposes. From now on I will use the term “moral injury” to refer only to damage to the 
acknowledgement of a person’s value.26
2.3: The Concept of Moral Injury Further Elaborated
 Several points of clarification are overdue. More must be said about  how acts can constitute 
denial. We must  also ask how denial can create the appearance of degradation and, importantly, to whom 
denial causes the victim to appear degraded. The third point  I will address is more difficult and concerns 
the relationship between the appearance of degradation and moral injury. I will argue that  Hampton would 
do best to understand the relationship to be a causal and not a constitutive relationship.
2.3.1: Acts that constitute denial
 In the examples above Hampton maintained that  acting in a certain way constitutes denial of 
something. Burning the Book of Kells would be to deny its value; burning and mutilating the farmhand 
and his sons was to deny their value as persons. This is the idea of expressive non-linguistic acts. I have 
already mentioned briefly that  Hampton deploys a Gricean analysis of the expressive meaning of acts. 
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26 I am also somewhat dubious of the fit between the first kind of moral injury (damage to the realization of a 
person’s value) and Hampton’s larger system. It is not clear to me, for instance, whether diminishment could cause 
or constitute this kind of moral injury. It seems more likely that this kind of injury would cause diminishment. What 
this would mean for Hampton’s analysis is a subject I cannot pursue here.
The details of Grice’s theory (and Hampton’s appropriation of it) are not crucial here.27 What is important 
is the idea that social rules can make it the case that certain acts, in certain contexts, have certain 
expressive meanings.28 Indeed, it is generally agreed that social rules determine the “meaning” of more 
than acts. John Searle, for example, writes of social rules of the form “X counts as Y in context C”, 
arguing that  rules of this form can be seen to determine what counts as a courthouse, what a religious 
sanctuary, and so forth (see Searle, 43-51).29 I will say an act communicates or expresses M when M is an 
expressive meaning of the act as determined by relevant social rules.30
 So, for example, in most  parts of the United States one can usually beckon without  giving offense 
by waving one’s fingers up and down, palm up, while in China such a gesture conveys disrespect—to 
beckon without  giving offense, one’s palm should face down. Social rules likewise determine which acts 
have the expressive meaning of greeting, thanking, ignoring, respecting, paying a bill, incurring a debt, 
voting, obtaining a degree, becoming an adult, getting married or divorced, attending a religious service, 
committing a crime, and so on.31 Most  directly to the point (for our case), rules determine which acts 
count as denial. In many parts of the world (I have in mind southern and eastern Africa in particular), a 
person who looks an elder in the eyes when being spoken to communicates the view that  the elder does 
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27 Hampton cites four ways Grice argues conduct can be meaningful: Natural meaning, word meaning, speaker 
meaning and conversational implicature (Hampton 1992, 1675-1678, citing Grice 1989).
28 I do not intend to make much more explicit what I have in mind when I use the word “meaning.” On Grice’s 
account, “x meant something” is roughly equivalent to “Somebody meant something by x”, and “A meant something 
by x” is roughly equivalent to “A in tended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the 
recognition of this intention” (Grice, 220). Searle (1969) attempts to amend this overly intention-centric account by 
acknowledging the role of social rules. For Searle, (in the case of illocutionary acts, which I discuss further below) a 
speaker means x when “the speaker intends to produce a certain effect by means of getting the hearer to recognize 
his intention to produce that effect; and furthermore, if he is using words literally, he intends this recognition to be 
achieved in virtue of the fact that the rules for using the expressions he utters associate the expression with the 
production of that effect” (Searle, 45). 
29 Andrew Altman discusses Searle in these terms (and uses the courthouse example) on page 78 of Altman’s 
“Expressive Meaning, Race, and the Law” (Legal Theory, 5 (1999), 75-99). The meanings of acts or spaces that are 
determined by such social rules can be distinguished from meanings determined by physical properties or “natural” 
meanings. Thus, while what counts as a courthouse is determined by social rules, what counts as a physical shelter is 
not (Altman, 78). Some, like Grice, argue that just as physical spaces, like shelters, can have natural meanings, so 
acts can have natural meanings. Hampton follows Grice on this point. Whether or not acts have a natural meaning is 
not crucial to the argument I present here, although the existence of natural meaning would be relevant if I were to 
work out the implications of my argument in more detail.
30 What an act communicates or expresses could be contrasted with the natural meaning of an act, which we might 
call evidence given by the act. This is the term Hampton uses when employing Grice’s analysis of natural meaning.
31 Most of the items on this list come from Altman, 78 and page 1506 of Anderson and Pildes’ “Expressive Theories 
of Law: A General Restatement” (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 148 (May 2000); 1503-1575).
not hold the social and moral stature that  the elder holds.32 In most  parts of the United States, by contrast, 
the expressive meanings of looking an elder in the eyes and failing to look an elder in the eyes are nearly 
reversed.
 Importantly, the idea that social rules determine the meaning of acts has implications for 
linguistic as well as non-linguistic acts. J. L. Austin famously made the case for understanding some 
speech as a kind of act.33 One of his speech-act  examples should illustrate the point.34 Two men stand 
beside a woman. One of the men turns to the other and says, “Shoot her.” The other man is shocked, but 
pulls out  a gun and shoots the woman. The first  man can be said to have performed several different 
speech-acts. First, he performed what Austin calls a locutionary act: he made sounds that  have a certain 
sense and reference as determined by English language conventions.35 Second, the man performed what 
Austin calls a perlocutionary act: by saying, “Shoot  her,” he shocked the second man and persuaded him 
to shoot the woman. This second kind of speech-act  is defined in reference to the effects of the act. Third, 
the man performed what Austin calls an illocutionary act: in saying “shoot  her”, he urged  the second man 
to shoot the woman. Notice that, depending on the context, the first man might  have used different 
locutionary acts to perform that  same illocutionary act of urging the second man to shoot  the woman.36 
Moreover, performing the same locutionary act, in a different context—in the context  of a joke, for 
example—the man might  not  have performed the illocutionary act of urging the second to shoot  the 
woman.
 Of the three kinds of speech-acts just enumerated, it  is illocutionary acts that  are of greatest  
importance for understanding what  kinds of acts can constitute denial. I will say Y performs the 
illocutionary act of denying X’s F (where F is some feature of X) if the relevant  social rules give Y’s act 
the expressive meaning, “X does not have F.” Part  of what it  means for the relevant social rules to give 
Y’s act the expressive meaning “X does not  have F” is for it to appear to competent navigators of the 
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32 This is an example taken from Tsitsi Dangarembga’s The Book of Not (Banbury, UK: Ayebia Clarke Pub., 2006).
33 See Austin’s How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962).
34 This is Rae Langton adaptation of Austin’s own example (Austin, 121), used on pages 27 and 28 in her essay, 
“Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” Chapter 1 in her Sexual Solipsism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
35 See Austin, 108.
36 He might has said, “This woman deserves to be shot.” Or, if they were members of a band of thugs looking to 
revenge a recent police tip-off, he might have said, “This is the woman who spoke to the police.”
relevant social rules that Y intends that  others understand her to express “X does not have F” by her act.37 
A simple example might  be where the man who said, “Shoot her,” in the example above, first  said, of the 
woman, “She is not innocent.” Assuming the context does not give the utterance an ironic or otherwise 
“non-standard” meaning, the man performs the illocutionary act of denying the woman’s innocence 
because relevant social rules give the act  the expressive meaning, “The woman does not  have the feature 
of innocence.”  All linguistic acts that  are illocutionary acts with the expressive meaning, “X does not 
have F” constitute denial of X’s F.
 Similarly, when Hampton holds that  Y’s non-linguistic act of intentionally disregarding X’s 
entitlement E is for Y to deny X’s value V, I take Hampton to mean that  Y’s intentionally disregarding X’s 
E has the expressive meaning “X does not  have V.” In a moment  I will turn to the evaluation of 
Hampton’s specific claims about the expressive meaning of intentionally disregarding an entitlement. The 
foregoing is offered in an attempt to explain Hampton’s general idea about acts’ constituting denial. Later, 
I will return to the role of linguistic acts in causing moral injury. The main idea, for now, is that the 
expressive meaning of many acts (linguistic and non-linguistic) is determined by social rules.
2.3.2: Denial that creates the appearance of degradation
 Denial of a person’s value can create the appearance of her degradation.38 The relation between 
denial of value and the appearance of degradation is therefore different from the relation between the act 
of burning, for example, and denial of value. The farmer’s act of burning counted as denial of the 
farmhand’s and his sons’ value because of certain social rules. In part, this is to say that it  appeared to 
competent  navigators of the relevant  rules that the farmer meant, by the act  of burning, “the farmhand and 
his sons do not  have the value of full personhood.” Once this denial was performed, it  was a further 
question whether it would appear to anyone that the farmhand and his sons did not  have the value of full 
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37 See Grice, 220 and Searle, 45.
38 I understand the creative relation to be a causal one. But by “causal,” here and throughout the rest of the essay, I 
mean to refer to a very loose sense of causality. For the most part, when I write of A’s causing B, I mean to refer to 
A’s causal contributions to B, whatever they are. I try to indicate the loose sense of causality being referred to by 
using phrases like “A can cause B.” This phrase still does not isolate the weak sense of causality I wish to use. A 
more adequate phrase might be “A can contribute causally to B,” but I opt to use the shorter phrase for the sake of 
convenience and insert this note. 
personhood. We can say that whereas the farmer’s act of burning the farmhand and his sons constituted 
denial of their value, denial of their value caused (created) the appearance of their degradation.
 Notice that  after determining that the farmer’s act counted as denial of the value of the farmhand 
and his sons, the question to ask was whether it would appear to anyone that the farmhand and his sons 
lacked the value the farmer denied. Hampton does not  limit  her interest  to what appears to be the case to 
competent  navigators of social rules. She does not  explicitly address this question. To create the 
appearance of Alex’s degradation, on this account, is then to make it the case that  it  appears to anyone 
else that Alex is degraded. Obviously, however, when thinking about wrongdoing, it matters to us to 
whom a person appears degraded and for what  reasons. Consider one case where I observe two people 
interacting in a language and according to social rules that  are unfamiliar to me; suppose the actions of 
one party make it  appear to me that  the other party is degraded. Contrast this first case with another where 
I am confident  of my understanding of the relevant social rules at  play and the actions of one party make 
it appear to me that  the other party is degraded. In the former case, I will probably hold to the appearance 
of degradation much more lightly, knowing that  I may have misread some of the actions of the two people 
interacting. If, for example, I concluded from one party’s actions that she thought  the other worthy of 
contempt, I might  agree that  the other is worthy of contempt, but tentatively. A number of complicated 
questions arise when we look at cases in which those to whom a person appears degraded (because of 
denial of her value) and the person who denies her value are not competent navigators of the same social 
rules. In the rest of my examples I will focus on relevant  actors who are competent  navigators of the same 
social rules. So, for me, to ask if denial of a person’s value creates the appearance of her degradation will 
be to ask if it  would appear to competent  navigators of the same social rules most  relevant  to the denial in 
question that the person is degraded.
 I offer a final general comment  about  denial of value and the appearance of degradation. The 
efficacy of the denial of a person’s value in creating the appearance of degradation depends, of course, on 
a number of factors. Among the factors is the relation of the people to whom it might appear that the 
victim is degraded to the person expressing the denial. I will return to this idea in Chapter 3.39
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39 See the end of 3.1.3.
2.3.3: Appearance of degradation and moral injury
 Finally, there is the question of how the appearance of degradation relates to moral injury 
(damage to the acknowledgement  of a person’s value). Does the appearance of degradation cause moral 
injury? Does it  constitute moral injury? Damage to the acknowledgement of a person’s value can be 
understood relatively easily as unfavorable change (or prevention of favorable change) in the 
acknowledgement of a person’s value. Unsurprisingly, then, the answers to the questions just  posed turn 
on the meaning of the terms “acknowledgement” and “appearance.” One might  suppose that for X to 
appear degraded to Y is for Y to believe that X is less valuable than she really is. One might also suppose 
that for Y to acknowledge X’s value is simply for Y to believe that X has the value she has. Damage to the 
acknowledgement of X’s value would then be unfavorable change (or prevention of favorable change) in 
Y’s beliefs regarding X’s value. On these definitions appearance of degradation could constitute moral 
injury insofar as those to whom the person appears degraded believe that she is less valuable than she 
really is. Hampton seems to hold that the appearance of degradation constitutes moral injury, although a 
few of her statements suggest that the appearance of degradation causes moral injury.40
 There are more plausible definitions of acknowledgement and appearance, however, and on these 
definitions the appearance of degradation can cause but not constitute moral injury. Appearance might be 
distinguished from belief—so that it could appear to me that  P but  I could fail to believe that P41—and 
acknowledgement might be said to be a kind of expressive act, where acknowledgement  of V has the 
same expressive meaning as the assertion that V exists (in normal contexts). If either or both of these 
definitions are accepted, the appearance of degradation cannot  constitute moral injury. If to acknowledge 
a person’s value is simply to believe that she has the value she has but appearance is distinguished from 
belief as above, then the appearance of a person’s degradation need not  be damage to the 
acknowledgement of the person’s value. If, on the other hand, acknowledgement of a person’s value is an 
expressive act  meaning the same as the assertion that her value exists, then the appearance of her 
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40 See footnote for the beginning of 2.2 above.
41 The Stoics forwarded a view of this sort, commonly referred to as their “doctrine of assent.” See, for example, the 
citation from Diogenes Laertius (DL 7.46-7.49) on logic and theory of knowledge in Inwood and Gerson, page 111.
degradation (on either definition of appearance) need not be damage to the acknowledgement of a 
person’s value. This is because it  might appear to Y that X is degraded while Y’s actions do not  express the 
idea that X is degraded (so that there is the appearance of degradation but no moral injury), or vice versa 
(so that  there is moral injury but no appearance of degradation). Knowing and regretting, for example, 
that I have been raised so that  the homeless appear to me to be of little worth (and, to that  extent, appear 
degraded), I might decide to serve food in a soup kitchen (so that my actions are actively acknowledging 
the value of the homeless and are not causing them moral injury). Or, to use an example just offered 
above, an elder might appear to me to be deserving of respect (and to that  extent  not appear degraded) and 
yet I might  fail to show respect  for the elder because my way of showing respect (avoiding her gaze) is 
taken by the elder herself and by other relevant social actors to mean that  I do not respect the elder (so 
that my actions cause the elder moral injury). On plausible definitions of acknowledgement  and 
appearance, then, diminishment cannot constitute moral injury.
 Quite clearly though—and on any of the definitions put forward above—the appearance of 
degradation can cause moral injury. When fellow pedestrians mistreat a homeless person—say, by 
mockingly imitating the way she talks—it might  appear to me that  the homeless person is worth less than 
she actually is, and this appearance of degradation could have several effects on me. It  might play a role 
in causing me to join the mockers in mistreating the homeless person. If acknowledgement of a person’s 
value is defined as an expressive act, then the appearance of degradation here has caused damage to the 
acknowledgement of the homeless person’s value because I have joined in an activity which expresses the 
view that  the homeless person does not  have the value she has. This is a case where the appearance of 
degradation helps to cause mistreatment, and the mistreatment constitutes moral injury because it  is 
unfavorable change in acknowledgement of the victim’s value. If acknowledgement is solely a matter of 
belief, it is still clear that the appearance of the homeless person’s degradation could cause her moral 
injury—for, as a result of the appearance of her degradation (caused by the mockers’ mistreatment  of her), 
I could come to believe that the homeless person has less value than she has. It is worth pointing out that 
moral injury could itself cause further appearance of degradation, and thereby, further moral injury. When 
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I join the mockers of the homeless person I begin to participate in creating the appearance of her 
degradation, which can then further damage the acknowledgement of her value.42
2.4: Causing Moral Injury: Claim-Violation and Claim-Contradiction
 Before turning to Hampton’s argument about  what kinds of acts cause moral injury, it is worth 
setting out, in broad strokes, my position on what we have seen of Hampton’s analysis. I accept 
Hampton’s general framework. I endorse the Kantian conception of human value. I agree that  at  least one 
important  kind of expressive wrongdoing is that which causes moral injury. In what  follows, I will only 
concern myself with the second type of moral injury, damage to the acknowledgement of the victim’s 
value. I accept the idea that denying a person’s value can create the appearance of her degradation. I have 
argued that  Hampton should understand the appearance of degradation to sometimes cause but not 
constitute moral injury.
 I will first offer Hampton’s account of moral injury as caused by claim-violation and then 
complicate the account with a number of distinctions that  will become useful in the third chapter. The 
basic aim is to loosen claim-violation from other elements Hampton recognizes in the causal chain 
leading to moral injury; once loosened, it  will be easier to see, in the third chapter, how acts that  are not 
claim-violation can still cause moral injury. Finally, I will suggest  that Hampton’s account  is overly 
consequentialist, ignoring the fact  that some acts can constitute wrongdoing directly, without  first causing 
the appearance of the victim’s degradation or even moral injury. In the next  chapter I will show how 
claim-contradiction (one element in moral injury’s causal chain) can cause moral injury without involving 
claim-violation, how the analysis of claim-contradiction can translate into an analysis of immunity-
contradiction. I will also identify one last way of wronging immunity- and claim-holders that  bypasses 
violation.
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42 It should be possible to bring into the causal narrative Hampton’s idea of damage to the realization of a person’s 
value. I will not do that here.
2.4.1: Hampton’s Account
 When drawing the Book of Kells analogy to illustrate diminishment, Hampton claimed that 
someone who intentionally disregards the entitlements of the Book of Kells is “denying that  the object 
really has [the] value [that  it  has], because he is denying the entitlements which that  value 
generates” (Hampton, 1992, 1674). As we saw earlier, the value that generates the entitlement  is part of 
the value of the entitlement-holder. If the entitlement-holder is a person, we can understand Hampton to 
be suggesting that  intentional disregard of an entitlement  is the sort  of act  that can cause moral injury. 
Intentional disregard of an entitlement  constitutes denial of the value that generates the entitlement; denial 
of the value that  generates the entitlement can create the appearance of degradation of the entitlement-
holder (because the value that generates the entitlement  is part of the value of the entitlement-holder); the 
appearance of degradation of the entitlement-holder can cause moral injury to the entitlement-holder. We 
must also account, however, for the denial of the entitlement  itself. Hampton writes that  intentional 
disregard of an entitlement constitutes denial of the value that generates the entitlement because it also 
constitutes denial of the entitlement itself. This implies that Hampton holds denial of the entitlement itself 
to constitute denial of the value that  generates the entitlement. With all this said, the passage quoted above 
seems to imply the following set of axioms.
A1: Intentional disregard of an entitlement constitutes denial of the entitlement.
A2: Denial of an entitlement constitutes denial of the value that generates the entitlement.
A3: Denial of the value that  generates an entitlement can cause the appearance of the 
entitlement-holder’s degradation.
A4: The appearance of the entitlement-holder’s degradation can cause moral injury to the 
entitlement-holder.
Taking into account  the transitivity of the constitutive relation, A1 and A2 imply that intentional disregard 
of an entitlement constitutes denial of the value that  generates the entitlement. Moreover, A3 and A4 
imply that  denial of the value that  generates an entitlement can contribute to causing moral injury to the 
entitlement-holder since, loosely speaking, if E1 can cause E2 and E2 can cause E3 then E1 can “help” 
cause E3. Putting these two implications together we arrive at the following:
A5: Intentional disregard of an entitlement  can help cause moral injury to the entitlement-
holder.
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In Hampton’s farmhand example, the farmer’s intentional disregard of the farmhands’ entitlements to not 
be burned or mutilated helped cause damage to the acknowledgement  of the farmhands’ value (one kind 
of moral injury). In a moment, I will offer a schematic that should provide a helpful summary of the 
relations just discussed. I will then turn to an evaluation of each of the four axioms. However, there are 
several terminological issues that must be addressed before moving forward.
 First, I think it  is fair to substitute in “claim” (by which I mean “Hohfeldian claim”) where 
Hampton uses “entitlement.”43 When sketching the Book of Kells analogy Hampton writes that “we take 
the object’s value to preclude many kinds of treatment with respect  to this object” (Hampton, 1992, 
1674); and when talking of moral injury to persons, she writes, “[a] person behaves wrongfully in a way 
that effects a moral injury to another when she treats the person in a way that is precluded by that person’s 
value” (Hampton, 1992, 1677). She seems to have in mind, here, acts that  disregard the sort of normative 
limits imposed by Hohfeldian claims, which make it  the case that  one ought not perform certain acts.44 
Second, when Hampton writes of the disregard of these claims she seems to have in mind what  is 
expressed by the term “violation” (at least  on its strict definition, given above)—namely, doing what the 
claim makes it the case one ought  not  do or failing to discharge a duty correlative to the claim. Third, 
notice that the word “denial” appears in two contexts in the above list  of axioms: the denial of a claim and 
the denial of the value that generates the claim. It  will be easier to give a clear argument  if I introduce the 
term “contradiction” and use it  in place of “denial” in the first context. To contradict a claim, in my sense, 
is simply to deny that the claim-holder has the claim. I translate A1 through A5 as follows.
A1': Intentional violation of a claim constitutes contradiction of the claim.
28
43 It might be safest to replace “entitlement” with “prima facie claim.” I will not be considering how my analysis 
would account for rights-conflict, however, so an interest in simplicity leads me to replace “entitlement” with 
“claim.”
44 I continue to ignore the problem of determining whether or not non-person objects can have entitlements, rights or 
claims. If Hampton accepts that to have a claim is to have a right, and if she further accepts that non-person objects 
cannot have rights, then she cannot hold that entitlements are claims (because she says the Book of Kells has 
entitlements). My guess is that Hampton would hold that non-person objects can have rights, though they might not 
be exactly like the rights that persons can have; and I would guess that she would hold that the entitlements objects 
can have are also somewhat dissimilar from the entitlements persons can have. If Hampton would hold these two 
things, then she could very well have claims in mind when she writes of entitlements—she could just say the claims 
non-person objects have are not the same as the claims person’s have. Hampton makes statements about the 
entitlements of non-person objects that I think she means to apply to persons (she uses the Book of Kells example as 
an illustration, after all); I reference her statements about non-person objects because I find them to be some of the 
clearest articulations of her views, which, as I say, I think also apply to persons.
A2': Contradiction of a claim constitutes denial of the value that generates the claim.
A3': Denial of the value that generates a claim can cause the appearance of the claim-holder’s 
degradation.
A4': The appearance of the claim-holder’s degradation can cause moral injury to the claim-
holder.
A5': Violation of a claim can help cause moral injury to the claim-holder.
I accept  A5', but  I will show that  A1' and A2' are false. I will agree with A3', but  identify another cause of 
diminishment of a claim-holder. I agree with A4'. Axioms A1' through A4' can be represented 
schematically as follows.
Figure 2.1: Hampton’s account
The key for the Figure 2.1 is the following.
 A = B  A constitutes B
 A ➝ B  A can cause B
I have deliberately left out mention of appearance of degradation in the damage to realization of value 
track, because it is unclear to me where Hampton would want to fit it in. The main purpose of the figure is 
to help illustrate the meaning of A1' through A4'.
 Finally, in the evaluation below, I will represent the idea that a certain value generates a certain 
claim as follows, where P1 is a certain person, C1 a certain claim and V1 a certain value.45
P1 has C1 because P1 has V1
29
45 Here I rely on Hampton’s notion of value generating claims (or, as Hampton calls them, entitlements). Recall that 
Hampton says that it is part of what it means for someone or something to have value for it to be the case that there 
are certain ways of treating the person or thing that are inappropriate. We might understand Hampton to hold that 
value entails claims. In the next chapter I will use Rainbolt’s “key argument form” to give a more nuanced picture of 
the relationship between value and the claims it generates.
In the argument below, Afonso is P1 and has C1 because he has V1. Manuel will be his adversary.46
2.4.2: Evaluation of A1' (Intentional violation of a claim constitutes contradiction of the claim)
 According to A1', if Afonso has C1, then for Manuel to intentionally violate Afonso’s C1 is for 
Manuel to contradict Afonso’s C1. Suppose that Afonso’s C1 makes it  the case that  Manuel should not 
break into Afonso’s house and steal Afonso’s KitchenAid mixer. It  is actually quite conceivable that 
Manuel could break into Afonso’s house, steal Afonso’s mixer and still acknowledge that Afonso had C1. 
In fact, it  is quite likely that  Manuel’s acts would not  be understood as denying that Afonso had C1; we 
know that  many criminals are perfectly aware that their victims had claims against their committing 
whatever crime the criminals committed. It  is still possible for the intentional violation of a claim to 
constitute contradiction of that claim, of course. To know whether or not and when it  does we should look 
to the social rules that  determine the expressive meaning of the act of intentional violation. Since there are 
at  least some instances of intentional violation that do not constitute contradiction, however, A1' is false.47 
Of course, it may well be that  every violation of C1 will express the view that  C1 is less weighty than it 
actually is, and this, in turn, might create the appearance of the victim’s degradation, causing the victim 
moral injury. I will not  pursue this question, however. What I aim to do is unhinge the contradiction of 
claims from the violation of claims. Here I have shown that  the violation of a claim does not always 
contradict  the claim. It  is also easy to see that one can contradict a claim—deny that it exists when it  does 
exist—without violating it, linguistically perhaps. Grice, Searle and others have helped us see how non-
linguistic acts can have meaning and constitute claim-contradiction. There are also straightforwardly 
linguistic ways of contradicting claims, however. Manuel might  simply declare that  Afonso has no claim 
against his taking the KitchenAid mixer.
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46 “Afonso” is the name of a prominent Mwene Kongo (ruler of the African Kingdom of Kongo) who reigned from 
1506 to the early 1540s. “Manuel I” (which I shorten to “Manuel”) is the name of the king of Portugal whose reign 
coincided with Afonso’s. Afonso wrote numerous, eloquent letters to Manuel and his successor, João III, informing 
them of the ways in which the Portuguese were mistreating the Kongo people. See Hochschild, pages 11 through 15.
47 Another example: General Fonda is angry about the war. She sees Donald, a noncombatant, standing nearby. The 
General is so angry that she pulls out her pistol, says, “Donald, I know you have a legal claim that I not shoot you, 
but I’m so angry I don’t care,” and then shoots him in the head. In this case, the General has clearly violated 
Donald’s noncombatant claim against being targeted with weapons of war, and yet she does not appear to have 
contradicted his claim—indeed, she explicitly acknowledged its existence.
2.4.3: Evaluation of A2' (Contradiction of a claim constitutes denial of the value that generates the 
claim)
 Suppose that, according to the relevant social rules, Manuel’s stealing Afonso’s KitchenAid mixer 
did (in this particular instance) count as contradiction of Afonso’s C1 against  Manuel’s taking his mixer. 
Suppose further that Afonso has C1 because he has some value V1. It  does not follow from Manuel’s 
contradiction of C1 that Manuel has denied Afonso’s V1. Manuel could acknowledge that Afonso has V1 
and simply deny that  V1 generates C1. For Manuel to deny that Afonso’s value generates a claim that it 
does generate can be a grave sort  of mistake (and I will say more about this in a moment), but committing 
this mistake is not equivalent to denying that Afonso has V1. A2' is false.
 Consider two Christians, Mary and Simon, who endorse what Hampton calls the Christian 
conception of value, holding that  humans are “intrinsically, equally, and permanently valuable insofar as 
each… is the child of God, made in His image” (Hampton 1992, 1673). Suppose Mary and Simon express 
agreement  that  humans’ equal value as children of God amounts to V2. It  is possible for Mary to believe 
that V2 generates C2, a claim against being capitally punished that  cannot  be outweighed by other 
considerations, and for Simon to disagree. Let us suppose that  Mary is right. Suppose now that Simon 
contradicts humans’ C2 by declaring loudly in city parks that  some people have no claim against  being 
capitally punished and by publicly donating large sums of money to groups that  pressure the government 
to capitally punish certain classes of criminals. The question is this: By contradicting humans’ C2 is 
Simon denying that humans have V2? That  is, would Simon’s contradiction of C2 be assigned the 
expressive meaning of denial of V2 by the relevant  social rules? Although his contradiction of C2 might be 
assigned this meaning, it  need not be. Indeed, many people who disagree with each other about  capital 
punishment have the sense that  they share an understanding of the value of humans; they feel that they 
simply disagree about what the value of humans implies about how we should treat them.
 I have tried to show, contra Hampton’s assumption, that it is possible to contradict  a claim 
without  denying the value that generates the claim. It is also possible to deny a value that generates a 
claim without  contradicting the claim generated. One could believe that  the claim is generated by some 
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other value that, in fact, does not generate the claim. I will not pursue this idea any further; I offer it only 
to further loosen the putative connection between the contradiction of a claim and the denial of the value 
that generates the claim.
2.4.4: Evaluation of A3' (Denial of the value that generates a claim can cause the appearance of the 
claim-holder’s degradation) and A4' (The appearance of the claim-holder’s degradation can cause 
moral injury to the claim-holder)
 Accepting A3' we get  an important result. Since (as we have seen) contradicting a claim can, but  
need not, constitute the denial of the claim-holder’s value, contradicting a claim can, but need not, cause 
the appearance of the claim-holder’s degradation.
Let  us return, now, to the observation that even if Simon’s contradiction of C2 does not count as 
denial of V2, it  seems his mistake—proclaiming that humans’ value has does not  generate a claim against 
being capitally punished that cannot  be outweighed by other considerations—is a morally significant one. 
(We are still assuming, for the sake of argument, that Simon is wrong about this.) Simon’s mistake seems 
morally significant not only because it could have deleterious consequences. Rather, his mistake seems, in 
its own way, disrespectful of humans and therefore wrongful. I want to suggest that  we distinguish 
between the existence of a person’s value and the importance of a person’s value. While Simon’s 
contradiction of C2 (in the example above) does not  constitute denial of the existence of humans’ V2, it 
does seem to constitute denial of the importance of humans’ V2. Just  as denial of the existence of a 
person’s value can cause the appearance that she lacks value that  she has (that she is degraded), so it  is 
easy to see that denial of the importance of a person’s value can cause the appearance that her value is not 
as important as it is.
I propose that  the latter appearance is also appearance of the person’s degradation and that this 
kind of appearance of degradation also causes moral injury. The nature of humans’ value—including its 
importance or weight—determines what  sort  of moral standing or status humans have. It is for someone 
to appear to lack the moral status she has for her value to appear less important than it is. Moral status, 
moreover, can be thought  of as part of moral value. To cause the appearance that a person’s value is less 
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important  than it is, therefore, is to cause the appearance that  her value is less than it is—that is, to cause 
the appearance of her degradation. Thus, Simon’s contradiction of C2, because it  constitutes denial of the 
importance of humans’ V2, might create one kind of the appearance of our degradation.
The final step links these two kinds of appearance of degradation to two kinds of damage to the 
acknowledgement of a person’s value. In my view, proper Kantian respect  of a person demands not only 
that one acknowledge the existence of her value, but  also that  one acknowledge the moral status her value 
gives her. Proper Kantian respect  of a person demands, in other words, that we acknowledge the 
implications of the person’s value. This, again, is because a person’s moral status—the implications or 
importance of the person’s value—is part of her moral value. If Simon’s contradiction of humans’ C2 
constitutes denial that  humans’ V2 generates humans’ C2 when it  does (by supposition), Simon might 
create the appearance that humans’ value is not as important as it  really is and, in turn, might cause 
damage to the acknowledgement  of the importance of humans’ V2, which is a kind of damage to the 
acknowledgement of humans’ value. If Simon’s contradiction of humans’ C2 constitutes denial of the 
existence of humans’ V2, Simon might  create the appearance that  humans’ lack value they have and, in 
turn, might cause damage to the acknowledgement of the existence of humans V2, which is another kind 
of damage to the acknowledgement of humans’ value.
It  seems to me that this move—distinguishing between the existence and importance of a certain 
value—or something like it, is one Hampton would accept. Its current formulation is problematic, 
however. Given the range of theories philosophers have put forward and will continue to put  forward in 
their attempts to figure out what kind of status our value as humans gives us, it seems likely that  every 
philosopher is wrong on at least some points, and most  of us mostly wrong. Many philosophers, therefore, 
have and will put forward theories that  create the appearance—to competent navigators of social rules 
that the philosophers share—that  humans’ value is not  as important as it actually is. This, in turn, causes 
damage to the acknowledgement of the importance of humans’ value. Have philosophers been wronging 
humankind in doing so, just as Simon did when he denied that  humans’ value gives them a claim against 
being capitally punished? The analysis given above seems to suggest that they have. This is 
counterintuitive (to say the least) because most philosophers’ efforts, while perhaps misguided, hardly 
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seem wrongful. Indeed, philosophers’ persistent  attempts to understand the status humans have because of 
their value seem to evince a powerful respect for that value.
Suppose something like the following philosophical argument  regarding global philanthropy is 
right: the value of the global poor is such that  they have a claim against  those of us who have more than 
we need that we give of what we have until giving more would make us needy ourselves. Let  us call this 
argument Singer’s argument.48  Those philosophers who write essays explaining why the value of the 
global poor does not  in fact  generate such a claim would then be denying the importance of the value of 
the global poor. As these philosophers’ essays are circulated (at  the very least among other philosophers), 
their arguments might  cause the appearance that  the value of the global poor is not as important as it  is—
that it does not  generate the claim it generates. Suppose the appearance philosophers had a hand in 
creating then helped a number of people decide against giving more support to efforts to reduce global 
poverty. We might  understand this as prevention of favorable change in the acknowledgement—through 
the expressive act of devoting resources to a problem—of the importance of the value of the global poor. 
In such a scenario, on the analysis I have given, the philosophers who wrote essays attempting to debunk 
Singer’s argument—though written in good faith—caused the global poor moral injury.
One might  sensibly conclude that partly as a result of the philosophical efforts of the essay-
writers mentioned above, many people were treated as if their value was less important  than it actually 
was. But  to say the essay-writers thereby wronged the global poor seems, to many, to stretch the meaning 
of the word “wrong.” Even someone who agreed that  essays written in support  of extreme miserliness 
would wrong the global poor could point out  that a number of the alternatives to Singer’s demanding 
theory are, as far as we can tell, quite reasonable, even if, in the end, Singer turns out to be right. This idea 
is promising, I think, and offers a way to distinguish between denials of the importance of a person’s 
value that do cause moral injury and those that do not.
What  we need is a qualified definition of moral injury. We can say that  damage to the 
acknowledgement of a person’s value only constitutes moral injury if it is caused by someone who should 
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48 This argument resembles, at least vaguely, the argument Peter Singer notoriously defends in his “Famine, 
Affluence and Morality” (Philosophy and Public Affairs, No. 1 (1972)).
know better. This idea is perhaps difficult  to pin down theoretically, but it  has intuitive explanatory power. 
Philosophers have not been wronging humans as they have elaborated their theories of human value 
(many flawed, by supposition) to the extent that  they are earnestly and responsibly tackling the questions 
they try to answer. It seems quite possible that a person might  develop and propagate ideas in a reckless 
manner. In such a case, it  does not  seem far-fetched at  all to say that the person is wronging at least a 
large number of humans. The Singer case, in particular, seems to be a borderline case. If Singer could 
come up with his theory, could we not  say that  his contemporaries should have known better, just as 
Singer did? This would help explain, I think, any split in opinions about whether Singer’s theoretical 
adversaries wronged the global poor in the example given above (where we assume Singer is right).49
2.4.5: Figure 2.2
 Another schematic representation is in order, now that  I have suggested various emendations to 
Hampton’s understanding of the relationships between violation, contradiction, denial of value, 
appearance of degradation and moral injury. I have made a similar suggestion at each point. Violation 
need not  constitute contradiction; contradiction need not  constitute denial of the existence of value but 
could, instead, constitute denial of the importance of value; denial of value can create two kinds of 
appearance of degradation, each of which can cause a kind of moral injury.
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49 For a recent discussion of the role of the epistemic requirement in determining responsibility for the consequences 
of actions, see Sher 2009.
Figure 2.2: Alternative account
The key for the Figure 2.2 is the following.
 A ⇒ B  A can constitute B
 A ➝ B  A can cause B
 A          
 ∩  A is a kind of B
 B
I have left out any representation of that which intentional violation of a claim could cause or constitute 
other than contradiction of the claim.
2.4.4: Summary
 I have tried to show that the violation of a claim does not always constitute contradiction of the 
claim. I have also tried to show that the contradiction of a claim does not always constitute denial of the 
value that generates the claim; sometimes contradiction of a claim can constitute denial that the value 
generates the claim. While this might  be taken to mean that contradiction of the second kind does not 
create the appearance of degradation, I have proposed that the notions of appearance of degradation and 
moral injury be expanded. One kind of appearance of degradation, I have suggested, is the appearance of 
the non-existence of the value in question; this kind of appearance of degradation can cause damage to the 
acknowledgement of the existence of the value. The second kind of appearance of degradation is the 
appearance that  the value is less important  than it really is; this kind of appearance of degradation can 
cause damage to the acknowledgement of the importance of the value.
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2.5: Beyond Moral Injury
 Until now, I have followed Hampton in limiting my inquiry into expressive wrongdoing to the 
sort of acts that cause moral injury. Although I do not  claim to be offering a complete catalogue of 
methods of expressive wrongdoing, it  is worth explicitly rejecting the consequentialist bent of Hampton’s 
account of expressive wrongdoing, according to which an act’s being wrongful has only to do with what it 
causes, namely, moral injury (damage to a person’s value). One trouble with such a consequentialist 
account is that once moral injury is defined, a skeptic can always reach for an example of an act that 
causes moral injury but is clearly not  wrongful. The Singer case, above, might  be such an example. The 
skeptic can also reach for examples of acts that are clearly wrongful though they cause no moral injury. 
Suppose, for example, a certain Sid shouts racial epithets at a certain Venus, creating the appearance of 
degradation, at  least on certain definitions, but causing no damage to the acknowledgement  of Venus’ 
value because those within hearing utterly reject the Sid’s suggestion that Venus is less valuable than she 
is. This example is a problem for Hampton’s analysis because although the victim’s value has not been 
damaged, she has clearly been wronged.50
 The less consequentialist expressivist theory of Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes does a 
better job of accounting for the Singer and Venus cases (and others like them). According to Anderson and 
Pildes, “what  makes an action morally right depends on whether it  expresses the appropriate valuations of 
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50 Hampton writes that “actual harm is not necessary for a wrong to exist; for example an attempt at murder that fails 
and does no harm to the intended victim is still a (highly) wrongful act” (Hampton 1992, 1661) and “[s]ome 
immoral actions are immoral only because of what they express, and not because of any concrete damage they 
inflict” (Hampton 1992, 1681), but she understands immoral actions (immoral only because of what they express, as 
in the failed attempted murder case) to be immoral because of the moral injury they cause (distinguished from 
“concrete damage” and regular “harm”). She thus has no way of explaining why some acts that cause no moral 
injury (such as Sid’s shouting racial epithets at Venus) nevertheless wrong the intended victim. Another sort of 
example that Hampton’s account has trouble with concerns actions that constitute wrongdoing but cause neither 
moral injury nor even the appearance of degradation. Suppose that a certain James secretly works out a plan to 
murder a certain Simone but that when James attempts to execute his plans, he fails to murder Simone in such a way 
that no one, not even Simone, suspects James of making his attempt. It seems quite plausible to say that James has 
wronged Simone in attempting to murder her; and yet, James has caused Simone neither moral injury, on Hampton’s 
definition, nor even the appearance of Simone’s degradation, because no one has learned of James’ attempt. At a 
stretch, one might say that James damaged the acknowledgement of Simone’s value via the perpetuation of his own 
beliefs regarding Simone’s value; but one would then still have no way of explaining why the attempted murder was 
worse than some other course of action he might have taken that would have done just as much to perpetuate his 
beliefs regarding Simone’s value—such as meditating every day on how much he hates her.
(that is, attitudes toward) persons” (Anderson/Pildes, 1504), where “to express” means to make manifest 
in speech or action (Anderson/Pildes, 1508). On this account, it is of little importance that those who 
heard Sid’s epithets were not thereby made to disacknowledge Venus’ value; it was enough for Sid’s 
actions to manifest  an inappropriate attitude toward Venus for his actions to constitute wrongdoing. The 
Singer case is more complex—and I do not intend to go into it  in depth—but  the Anderson/Pildes account 
at  least gives us the tools for constructing a more plausible explanation than the one given above. In 
particular, their account  allows us to turn our focus away from the effects of the works of philosophy in 
question and toward the attitudes these works of philosophy expressed at  their writing. This allows us to 
differentiate between two pieces of philosophical writing that have the same effect in terms of the 
acknowledgement of the value of humans but  that express different  attitudes at  their writing. Determining 
which attitudes are appropriate—and, thus, which works of philosophy wrong humankind—is clearly a 
difficult task, and it  may not  yield results that cohere perfectly with our intuitions. But  this analysis allows 
us to be more flexible in our evaluation of philosophers’ work so that we can more easily avoid the 
preposterous conclusion that  all (or at  least  most) moral philosophers are wronging humankind in 
developing what must  be flawed accounts of human value. It is not  clear to me how Hampton’s more 
consequentialist  account  of expressive wrongdoing should be combined with the less consequentialist 
account put forward by Anderson and Pildes. The latter account  seems to do a better job of identifying 
cases of wrongdoing. On the other hand, it  seems right that at  least with some cases of wrongdoing, the 
fact that the act in question causes moral injury is a crucial part of our evaluation of the act.
 What  I aim to have done here is simply to have identified another way of treating claims that 
wrong the claim-holders. Here, as in Hampton’s account, we are concerned with acts that have certain 
expressive meanings. We can focus on acts that constitute contradiction of a claim, denial of the existence 
of the value that  generates the claim or denial of the importance of the value that  generates the claim. 
Claim-violation can be such an act, but  it need not be (as shown above). In the next chapter I will argue 
that one way to wrong a claim-holder is to cause her moral injury by contradicting her claim—suggesting, 
through word or action, that it  does not  exist—without necessarily violating the claim (relying on the 
Hampton account). I will also argue that contradicting a claim can constitute wrongdoing without causing 
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the claim-holder moral injury, simply by expressing inappropriate attitudes about the claim-holder’s value 
(relying on the Anderson/Pildes account). Next, I will argue that  an immunity-holder can also be wronged 
through the contradiction of her immunity in these two ways. Finally, I will point to a third way in which 
legal immunities (and claims) can be treated that constitutes wrongdoing.
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CHAPTER 3: Immunity-Contradiction
3.1: Contradiction
I have tried to show that the contradiction of a claim can cause two types of moral injury: damage 
to the acknowledgement of the existence the victim’s value and damage to the acknowledgement of the 
importance of the victim’s value. I have tried to show that  contradiction of a claim causes these two types 
of moral injury by denying the victim’s value and denying the importance of the victim’s value, 
respectively. I have also tried to show that it  is possible to violate a claim without  contradicting it. The 
question naturally arises: Is it  possible to contradict a claim without  violating it, while still causing the 
kinds of moral injury just  named? Hampton, for one, agrees that  the answer is affirmative. As we saw 
before, she holds that “[a] person behaves wrongfully in a way that effects a moral injury to another when 
[1] she treats that  person in a way that is precluded by that  person’s value,” but  she continues: “and/or by 
[2] representing him as worth far less than his actual value” (Hampton, 1992, 1677, emphasis added). I 
interpret this last method of effecting moral injury as equivalent to denying the existence of the victim’s 
value and denying the importance of the victim’s value. In other words, I think Hampton’s statement 
supports the idea that moral injury can be inflicted through the contradiction of a claim directly—non-
linguistically or linguistically—without violation.
We have already seen how this might  work. Humans might have a claim against  being capitally 
punished; but Simon need not violate that  claim in order to contradict it. Given the right social rules, of 
course, violating the claim could count as contradicting the claim. As we saw in the last  chapter, 
however,51 Simon could contradict the claim through the non-linguistic act of giving financial support to 
organizations that  pressure the government to use capital punishment. Though obvious, it is worth stating 
explicitly that claims can be contradicted linguistically as well as non-linguistically. Suppose Manuel’s 
friend, João, owes Afonso a great  deal of money. Manuel might  say to João, “You don’t  really have to 
give Afonso the money.” In certain contexts (under certain social rules), this linguistic contradiction—
along with other forms of contradiction—could constitute denial of Afonso’s possessing the sort  of value 
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51 See section 2.4.3.
that would give weight to promises made to him. This implication could create the appearance of 
Afonso’s degradation, which could cause damage to the acknowledgement  of Afonso’s value. Notice that 
Manuel would not, thereby, have violated the claim in question, for it is not Manuel who owes Afonso the 
money.
Once we acknowledge that  one can cause moral injury to a claim-holder through contradicting 
her claim, without  violating that claim, the Anderson/Pildes account  helps us see that one can wrong a 
claim-holder through the contradiction of her claim without violating that  claim and without causing her 
moral injury. The contradiction of a claim, if it  expresses the wrong attitudes about the value of the claim-
holder, constitutes wrongdoing, whether or not it causes moral injury.
Like violation, contradiction of a claim is a way of treating the claim that  wrongs the claim-
holder. I am in search of a way of treating an immunity that  wrongs the immunity-holder. I propose that 
just  as it  is possible to cause wrong a person by contradicting a claim that she has, so it is possible to 
wrong a person by contradicting an immunity that she has. Immunity-contradiction is a form of 
wrongdoing that is analogous to claim-violation. Immunity-contradiction, of course, operates at  a 
different  level. Violating a claim, for instance, can be a way of contradicting it. I will re-summarize 
Hampton’s analysis, as I suggest  it  be amended for application to the cases I am interested in. Kant  shows 
us that  all humans share a certain intrinsic value. Grice shows us that  many acts have an expressive 
function. Hampton shows us that, of the expressive acts, some create the appearance of the victim’s 
degradation. I argue that  the contradiction  of the victim’s claim or immunity creates the appearance of the 
victim’s degradation either when it constitutes denial of the existence of the value that generates the 
victim’s claim or immunity, or when it  constitutes denial of the importance of that value. Respectively, 
these denials can create the appearance that the victim’s value does not exist or the appearance that the 
victim’s value is not as important as it is. These two kinds of appearance of degradation can cause, 
respectively, the following two forms of moral injury: 1) damage to the acknowledgment  of the existence 
of the victim’s value and 2) damage to the acknowledgement of the importance of the victim’s value. 
Finally, the contradiction of a victim’s claim or immunity can constitute wrongdoing directly, whether or 
not it causes moral injury, so long as it denies the existence or importance of the victim’s value.
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In the next  section, I will introduce a kind of formal analysis that  will help clarify how 
contradiction of a claim or an immunity can constitute denial of either the existence of the value that 
generates the claim or immunity or the importance of that value. I will then move to the problem of 
extending this analysis to legal claims and immunities. Finally, I will introduce a third way of treating a 
claim or immunity that wrongs the claim- or immunity-holder without violation.
3.1.1: The Key Argument Form and Claim-Contradiction
 I will use a modified version of what George Rainbolt calls in his book on rights the “key 
argument form.”52  Rainbolt  argues that the key argument form captures at least  some of the ways we 
conceive of the relationship between a person’s possessing a claim or immunity and whatever it is that 
gives that  person the claim or immunity. We begin by thinking of the fact  that  a person possesses a claim 
or immunity as following from two other facts. This situation can be represented with a formal argument. 
The conclusion states that some person P has some claim C. The first premise states that  P has some 
value V. The second premise states that  if P has V, then P has C. The second premise can be thought  of as 
a moral rule that tracks the fact that V generates C. The modified key argument  form can be symbolized 
as follows.
1) P has V.
2) If P has V, then P has C.
 Therefore,
3) P has C.
 To demonstrate how the key argument  form can represent  situations of interest, I return to 
Hampton’s farmhand case. I will simplify exposition by referring to the farmhand and his sons simply as 
Farmhand and to the farmer as Farmer. Farmhand has a claim against Farmer that Farmer not  burn 
Farmhand in a burlap bag because Farmhand has the value which all humans have in virtue of their full 
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52 Rainbolt first introduces the key argument form on page 120. The final form is given on page 221. I have 
modified the key argument form by replacing “feature” in the premises with “value.” I do this in order to make it 
easier to use the key argument form to clarify the Hamptonian analysis given in the second chapter. I will return to 
Rainbolt’s version of the key argument form when I try to extend the analysis to the contradiction of legal claims 
and immunities.
personhood. This situation can be expressed in the key argument form as follows. Call this argument 
“Burn.”
1) Farmhand has the value which all persons have in virtue of their full personhood (V1).
2) If Farmhand has the value which all persons have in virtue of their full personhood (V1), then 
Farmhand has a claim against Farmer that Farmer not burn Farmhand in a burlap bag (C1).
 Therefore,
3) Farmhand has a claim against Farmer that Farmer not burn Farmhand in a burlap bag (C1).
According to the expanded definition of moral injury, Farmer can cause Farmhand moral injury if he 
creates the appearance that  Farmhand lacks the value he has (by denying the existence of his value) or if 
he creates the appearance that Farmhand’s value is less important than it  is (by denying the importance of 
his value). The key argument form makes it easy to see how Farmer can do this.53
 Contradiction of Farmhand’s C1—any act, linguistic or non-linguistic, that has the expressive 
meaning of “Farmhand does not  have C1” and therefore denies the conclusion of Burn—is one way to 
cause Farmhand these kinds of moral injury. Burn above is a valid argument. If Farmer contradicts 
Farmhand’s C1—saying, “I have no duty not to burn Farmhand in a burlap bag”—then many listeners will 
infer (according to the relevant  social rules) that  Farmer believes Burn to be unsound. That  is, depending 
on the circumstances, they might infer that  Farmer believes that  Premise 2 is true but  Premise 1 is false 
(i.e. that Farmhand does not have V1, but  if he did, he would have C1), that Premise 1 is true but Premise 2 
is false (i.e. that Farmhand has has V1, but  his having V1 is not sufficient  for him to have C1), or that 
Premise 1 and Premise 2 are both false (i.e. that  Farmhand does not have V1, and even if he did, he would 
not have C1). In many circumstances, under many social rules, listeners would believe that Farmer agrees 
that full personhood guarantees one a claim against being burned in a burlap bag, and so they would most 
likely conclude that  Farmer thinks he has no duty to Farmhand because Farmhand does not have full 
personhood. In such a case, Farmer’s contradiction of C1 would express the view that  Premise 1 is false 
and so deny that Farmhand has value that he has, thereby creating the appearance of his degradation, 
which could cause him moral injury.
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53 If Burn above is sound, then one way Farmer can cause Farmhand moral injury is to straightforwardly, and 
without reference to Farmhand’s claim to not be burned in a burlap bag (C1), deny that Farmhand has the value 
which all persons have in virtue of their personhood (V1). Similarly, Farmer might, without reference to Farmhand’s 
C1, deny that if Farmhand had V1 then he would have C1.
 This is the most likely interpretation of Hampton’s example, given plausible assumptions about 
the social rules that  were relevant in the example. It  shows how Farmer’s actions can be thought  of as 
denying Farmhand’s value. In the Simon case above, however, we saw that  he might contradict  humans’ 
claim against being capitally punished because he thinks humans’ value does not generate such a claim. 
Simon’s contradiction, in this case, could be understood as a denial of the second premise of the 
appropriate argument in the key form. To contradict  a claim in such a way that  denies the second premise 
of the key argument form is to create the appearance of the victim’s degradation by denying the 
importance of the value that  generates the contradicted claim. I have appropriated the Anderson/Pildes 
account in order to argue that  the contradiction of a claim that  denies either premise in the key argument 
form will constitute wrongdoing, whether or not such denial creates the appearance of the victim’s 
degradation or causes the victim moral injury.
The key argument form can be used to clarify the relationship between violation and 
contradiction. Suppose we put into the key argument form Afonso’s claim against Manuel’s breaking into 
Afonso’s house and stealing Afonso’s KitchenAid mixer (calling the argument  “Break In”). To put  what I 
tried to show above (at 2.4.2) in other words, Manuel could violate Afonso’s claim while coherently 
acknowledging Break In to be a sound argument. There are various ways Manuel’s violation of Afonso’s 
claim, in such a case, could still be said to cause Afonso moral injury; but I will not  go into this here. 
Violation can, of course, express the view that the violated claim does not exist. When violation does this, 
it  wrongs the victim partly because it constitutes contradiction of the claim. Simon might express his view 
that humans do not have a claim against  being capitally punished by capitally punishing a human. It  is 
then a further question whether the violation is also a contradiction that  denies Premise 1 (expressing the 
view that  humans lacks the value of children of God, to continue with the example) and whether it is a 
contradiction that  denies Premise 2 (expressing the view that  humans’ value as children of God does not 
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or would not  give them a claim against being capitally punished). Not  all forms of contradiction are 
violation, however. As already shown above, it is possible to contradict a claim without violating it.54
3.1.2: The Key Argument Form and the Contradiction of Moral Immunities
 This analysis is easy to extend to the case of immunities since immunities, like claims, can be the 
subject of the conclusion of an argument in the key form. I will illustrate the application of contradiction-
analysis to immunities by modifying Burn above. Suppose that  the farmer does not  kill the farmhands but 
that his son does instead. Suppose further that  the farmer and his son believe the son has no duty to refrain 
from brutally killing the farmhands because the farmer removed that  duty by granting the son permission 
to brutally kill the farmhands. The father “removed” the farmhand’s claim against  being brutally killed by 
proclaiming that the farmhand no longer had a claim against  the farmer’s son that the farmer’s son not kill 
the farmhand. The wrong the farmer has done the farmhands can be explained as contradiction of an 
immunity possessed by the farmhands. Call the following argument “Permission to Burn.”
1) Farmhand has the value which all humans have in virtue of their full personhood (V1).
2) If Farmhand has the value which all humans have in virtue of their full personhood (V1), then 
Farmhand has an immunity against  Farmer that  Farmer not  turn “Farmhand has a claim 
against Farmer’s Son that  Farmer’s Son not burn Farmhand in a burlap bag” into “Farmhand 
has a no-claim on Farmer’s Son that Farmer’s Son not  burn Farmhand in a burlap bag” by 
saying, “Farmhand, I’ve decided you no longer have a claim against my son that  he not  burn 
you in a burlap bag” (I1).
 Therefore,
3) Farmhand has an immunity against  Farmer that  Farmer not  turn “Farmhand has a claim 
against Farmer’s Son that  Farmer’s Son not burn Farmhand in a burlap bag” into “Farmhand 
has a no-claim on Farmer’s Son that Farmer’s Son not  burn Farmhand in a burlap bag” by 
saying, “Farmhand, I’ve decided you no longer have a claim against my son that  he not  burn 
you in a burlap bag” (I1).
Since both premises are true (and the argument  is valid), Permission to Burn is a sound argument. If 
Permission to Burn is sound, then the Farmer is disabled from changing the original relation (Farmhand’s 
claim against  Farmer’s Son) into the resulting relation (Farmhand’s no-claim on Farmer’s Son). By 
proclaiming that he has changed the original relation into the resulting relation, the Farmer contradicts the 
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54 A complication that would take me too far afield if I tried to unravel it fully arises when we consider claims that 
are generated by conjunctions of values. Suppose one has to have both V1 and V2 in order to have C1. What 
expressive meaning does the contradiction of C1 have? The answer, of course, can only be found by looking at the 
relevant social rules. It might be that the contradiction of C1 implies the denial of both values, of one or the other or 
of neither, depending on what the contradiction implies regarding the importance of the values.
conclusion of Permission to Burn. Farmer’s proclamation will most  likely, in the circumstances, imply 
that he does not  accept Premise 1. Farmer’s contradiction of the conclusion of Permission to Burn 
therefore probably counts as denial that Farmhand has value that  he has. This denial constitutes 
wrongdoing directly; it  probably also creates the appearance of Farmhand’s degradation, which in turn 
almost certainly causes damage to the acknowledgement of the Farmhand’s value so that the Farmhand 
suffers moral injury.
 The following objection may be raised. The value that generates both Farmhand’s claim against 
Farmer’s Son and Farmhand’s immunity against  Farmer is the value Farmhand has in virtue of his full 
humanity. If Farmer’s contradiction of Farmhand’s immunity counts as denial of Farmhand’s value in 
virtue of his humanity, then Farmer is, at once, denying the value that  generates Farmhand’s immunity 
and the value that  generates Farmhand’s claim. But if the Farmer denies the value that  generates 
Farmhand’s claim, then we might  suppose that Farmer does not  believe Farmhand has the claim (although 
he could think Farmhand has the claim for some other reason). If Farmer does not believe Farmhand has 
the claim, however, it would never occur to him to form an opinion about Farmhand’s having an 
immunity to protect that claim—from his point  of view, there would be nothing to protect. This seems to 
mean that contradiction of an immunity that counts as denial of the value that  generates the immunity will 
also be denial of the value that generates the relation the immunity is about. (This assumes that  the 
immunity and the relation the immunity is about are always generated by the same value; I will not 
challenge this assumption here.) The objection then is this: any case of immunity-contradiction will 
reduce to contradiction of the relation the immunity is about. This ultimately amounts to the assertion that 
any contradiction of a second-order relation will reduce to contradiction of a first order relation.
 There are a few problems with this objection, but  the main one is the following. Humans are not 
consistent in their recognition or disregard of important  normative facts do not expect other humans to be 
any different. That is, the mere fact that  Farmer’s actions constitute denial of the value Farmhand has that 
generates a certain claim does not mean that  Farmer could not, through other actions, acknowledge that 
same value as it related to some other claim.
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3.1.3: The Key Argument Form and the Contradiction of Legal Immunities
I wish to return to the problem raised in Chapter 1, where we started looking for a way to explain 
why Congress’ passing the Anti-Sedition Act would treat  U.S. citizens’ right  to free speech in such a way 
that it  would wrong them. We only have the tools for analyzing Congress’ contradiction of U.S. citizens’ 
moral immunities. Such an analysis would be useful, but  the puzzle we started with—drawn from 
Edmundson’s discussion of claims and immunities—concerned the wrong Congress would do U.S. 
citizens by treating their legal immunities in a certain way. I want to stay away from the problem of 
relating moral immunities to legal immunities. So far, I have looked only at  moral claims and immunities 
that are generated by some moral value. The second premise in the key argument  form has been treated as 
a moral rule that  tracks the fact that  some value generates some moral claim or immunity. The 
conclusions of the arguments I have looked at have all been about moral claims or immunities. The wrong 
done (through contradiction or violation) to the claim- or immunity-holder, moreover, has been a moral 
wrong. I have relied to a large extent on Hampton’s concept of moral injury, which I have argued should 
include not  only damage to the acknowledgement  of the existence of the victim’s value but also damage 
to the acknowledgement of the importance of the victim’s value.
The simplest  way to extend the foregoing analysis of immunity-contradiction to legal immunities 
will be to articulate a concept  of legal injury that can parallel moral injury. Once again, I want  to avoid 
making any particular claims about how the two are related. In the case of moral claims and immunities, 
we began with the idea that certain kinds of value generate certain moral claims and immunities. In the 
case of legal claims and immunities, I will say that legal systems are such that  certain legally significant 
features (all relative to a given legal system) of persons generate certain legal claims and immunities. Just 
as moral injury is damage done to the acknowledgement  of a person’s moral value, so I will say that  legal 
injury is damage done to the acknowledgement  of a person’s legally significant features. At least some of 
these features, like moral value, are immutable facts. My membership in the human species, for instance, 
is considered by most legal systems to be a legally significant  feature; and like Kantian moral value, there 
is nothing anyone can do (at  least  for now) to change a person’s membership in the species. Some legally 
significant features are not immutable but  are rather determined by the legal system—marital status is an 
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example, as is citizenship. I will have more to say about this particular kind of feature below. For now I 
will say that  the kind of legal injury I am interested in is damage to the acknowledgement  of the existence 
of the victim’s legally significant features and damage to the acknowledgement of the importance of the 
victim’s legally significant features. Finally, I will be concerned with legal injury that is done by 
contradicting legal claims and immunities, thereby denying premises in the key argument form and 
creating the appearance of degradation. Creating the appearance of a person’s degradation, in the legal 
case, will be creating the appearance that  one of her legally significant  features does not  exist  or is not  as 
important  as it is (in the legal system in question). Contradiction that counts as denial of the first premise 
will cause damage to the acknowledgement of the existence of the victim’s legally significant features; 
and contradiction that  counts as denial of the second premise will cause damage to the acknowledgement 
of the importance of the victim’s legally significant features. In parallel with moral injury, the two kinds 
of damage can be considered forms of damage to the acknowledgement of the legal status of the victim.
It  should now be possible to return to the case of the Anti-Sedition Act. Call the following 
argument “Sedition.” I will consider the status of one U.S. citizen, who I will call Wilbur.
1) Wilbur has the legally significant feature of being a U.S. citizen (F1).
2) If Wilbur has the legally significant feature of being a U.S. citizen (F1), then Wilbur has a 
legal immunity with respect  to the U.S. Congress that the U.S. Congress not turn “Wilbur has 
a legal liberty to speak critically of the U.S. government” into “Wilbur has a legal duty to 
refrain from speaking critically of the U.S. government” by passing any law (I2).
 Therefore,
3) Wilbur has a legal immunity with respect  to the U.S. Congress that the U.S. Congress not turn 
“Wilbur has a legal liberty to speak critically of the U.S. government” into “Wilbur has a 
legal duty to refrain from speaking critically of the U.S. government” by passing any law (I2).
Congress wrongs Wilbur, and all U.S. citizens, if it passes an Anti-Sedition Act  that makes illegal any 
U.S. citizen’s speaking critically of the U.S. government. One aspect  of this wrong can be understood as 
immunity-contradiction. By passing the Act, Congress appears to acknowledge that U.S. citizens once had 
a legal liberty to speak critically of the U.S. government. What  Congress denies, when it claims to have 
created a legal duty to refrain from speaking critically against the U.S. government, is the legal disability 
imposed on Congress by the U.S. Constitution with respect  to creating such a legal duty. At  the other end 
of the disability, so to speak, are the U.S. citizens’ immunities. Each U.S. citizen holds a legal immunity 
with respect to Congress that  Congress not create such a legal duty. Congress contradicts each of those 
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immunities when it  passes the Anti-Sedition Act. In the Wilbur’s case, Congress denies the conclusion of 
Sedition above. By contradicting Wilbur’s immunity (I2), Congress might  cause Wilbur legal injury in 
three ways. Congress’ act might  count  as denial of Premise 1 of Sedition and therefore as denial of 
Wilbur’s legally significant feature; Congress’ act  might  count as denial of Premise 2 of Sedition and 
therefore as denial of the importance of Wilbur’s legally significant  feature; or Congress’ act  might count 
as denial of both Premise 1 and Premise 2. Since it appears the Anti-Sedition Act is to apply to all U.S. 
citizens, it is unlikely that Congress’ passing the Act  would be taken as denial of Premise 1 of Sedition. It 
would be preposterous to understand Congress to believe that  no U.S. citizens are actually U.S. citizens.55 
Rather, Congress’ passing the Act will most likely be understood as denying that Wilbur’s U.S. citizenship 
is sufficient to generate I2. In other words, it  will be understood to be rejecting the notion that  U.S. 
citizenship makes it  impossible for Congress to create the duty to refrain from criticizing the government. 
To deny that Wilbur’s citizenship is sufficient to generate I2 causes Wilbur legal injury because it  causes 
damage to the acknowledgement of the importance of one of his legally significant  features—one form of 
damage to Wilbur’s legal status.
 The application of this analysis to the example given in the Introduction is similar. Recall that  the 
City of Birmingham passed, appealed to and tried to enforce an unconstitutional ordinance that  restrained 
free speech. Appealing to this ordinance, treating it  as if it were law, was a way for the City of 
Birmingham to contradict Dr. King’s immunity against  having his liberty to enjoy freedom of speech 
turned into a duty to refrain from enjoying that freedom. The City’s contradiction of Dr. King’s immunity 
could count  as denial of either premise in the relevant  key argument  form. The City’s contradiction might 
have constituted denial that  Dr. King was the sort of individual that was afforded the protections of the 
Constitution; the contradiction might also have constituted denial that being a U.S. citizen is sufficient to 
enjoy the protection of the First  Amendment—perhaps the City thought  one had to be a citizen and of a 
certain race. Whatever the City’s actions communicated, it  seems clear that they created the appearance of 
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55 It is of course possible that the expressive meaning of Congress’ passing the Act could be different as it relates to 
different people. That is, with relation to Wilbur it might imply that he is not a U.S. citizen while with relation to a 
another citizen (with a different skin color, perhaps) it might imply that her citizenship does not secure her the 
immunity in question. In this particular case, however, it seems most likely that the relevant social rules would make 
Congress’ passing the Act count as denial of Premise 2 of Sedition for all citizens.
Dr. King’s degradation—either that  he lacked certain important legal features that he had or that certain of 
his legal features were less important  than they actually were—which, in turn, likely caused damage to 
the acknowledgement of Dr. King’s value—either its existence or its importance.
 It  will be remarked that  passing the Anti-Sedition Act or passing and appealing to the 
unconstitutional City of Birmingham ordinance seem to do less to create the appearance of Wilbur’s 
degradation than did the farmer’s burning the farmhands. It seems clear, then, that the expressive power 
of different acts depends on what sort of acts they are and who commits them. The farmer’s burning the 
farmhands had great expressive power—and therefore probably caused great  injury—partly because of 
the nature of his act.56 Passing the Anti-Sedition Act, though perhaps doing less to create the appearance 
of degradation of each individual affected, would still be very powerful and very injurious; and this seems 
to be a function of who performed the expressive act  (the U.S. government) and the nature of the act 
(legislation).
 A good example of different  individuals’ being able to inflict different amounts of moral or legal 
injury—an example that, regretfully, I cannot  give a full exposition here—can be found in the literature 
on the laws of war regarding noncombatant  immunity.57 The Geneva Convention makes it  the case that 
each noncombatant is an illegitimate target of weapons of war (that each noncombatant has a claim 
against being targeted with weapons of war) and that  no noncombatant can be turned into a legitimate 
target  of weapons of war unless he chooses to become a combatant  (that each noncombatant has an 
immunity against all others that those others not  get  rid of his claim against being targeted with weapons 
of war). In this case, it  is easy to see that  different individuals, because of their different statuses, could 
inflict drastically different amounts of moral and/or legal injury on noncombatants through contradiction 
of their immunity against being made legitimate targets. A military General who declares that a group of 
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56 It is worth emphasizing that no act I have discussed so far is guaranteed to cause damage to the acknowledgement 
of the victim’s value. It might have been that the only people who knew about the farmer’s mistreatment of the 
farmhands were people who absolutely refused to believe that the farmhands did not have a claim against such 
treatment. It could well be, in certain circumstances, that a horrendous act does no damage to the acknowledgement 
of the victim’s value. In such cases, we must turn to alternative analyses of wrongdoing—like Hampton’s analysis of 
damage to the realization of the victim’s value—in order to explain how the act wronged the victim.
57 Some important works on noncombatant immunity include: Thomas Nagel’s essay “War and Massacre” (which 
can be found in his Mortal Questions), Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, Igor Primoratz’s essay “Civilian 
Immunity in War” and, more recently, Jeff McMahan’s Killing in War.
noncombatants have become legitimate targets (saying that she has judged the group in question to be 
corrupt  and unclean and therefore deserving of extermination) could cause the group much greater moral 
and/or legal injury than could a regular foot soldier.
3.2: Atrophying Rights and the Need for Vindication
 Hampton aimed to show that  retributive punishment can be an appropriate response to acts that  
cause moral injury because it  has the power to repair the damage done to the victim’s value. Retributive 
punishment repairs this damage by, as Hampton put it, vindicating  the victim’s value (Hampton 1992, 
1686). Hampton was not the first  to point  out that  punishment can vindicate. Joel Feinberg, in his 
landmark essay, “The Expressive Function of Punishment,” put  forward the idea that  punishment can be 
distinguished from penalty in part because punishment can have the expressive function of vindicating the 
law (Feinberg, 104). Indeed, Hampton’s expressive theory of retributive punishment can be understood as 
working from Feinberg’s central idea about  the expressive nature of punishment.58 What does Feinberg 
mean by the expressive function of vindicating the law, and how does it  relate to Hampton’s vindication 
of moral value?
 Feinberg gives the following example of a law that was in need of his sort  of vindication. There 
was a time in Mississippi (as there has been in many other places), when grand juries routinely failed to 
indict and trial juries routinely failed to convict  white people who murdered black people (Feinberg, 104). 
Though the law against murder stayed on the books in Mississippi, Feinberg argues that a law of this kind 
“honored mainly in the breach” as it  is, “begins to lose its character as law” (Feinberg, 104). Punishment 
of white murderers in Mississippi, at that time, would have served to reaffirm  the law and thereby help it 
retain its character as law (Feinberg, 104). For Feinberg, punishment can vindicate the law by reaffirming 
it in this way. Hampton, too, of course, was concerned with reaffirmation, but  she was concerned with 
reaffirmation of victims’ value.
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58 Heather J. Gert, Linda Radzik, and Michael Hand write that Hampton “builds on Joel Feinberg’s work on the 
expressive function of punishment” (Gert et. al., 79).
 Hampton and Feinberg seem to have keyed in on different implications of wrongdoing. Hampton 
focused mainly on the idea that  wrongdoing could deny the value that generates claims; Feinberg was 
concerned with the idea that wrongdoing could deny the existence of legal rules that  generate claims. 
Rainbolt  gives us a way to see how moral claims and immunities as well as legal claims and immunities 
are generated by rules, together with features of the claim- or immunity-holder. The feature of persons 
that we have looked at in the case of moral claims and immunities has been their moral value. In the case 
of legal claims and immunities, the features of persons we have looked at  have been what  I called legally 
significant features. The rules, of course, have been moral in the case of moral claims and immunities and 
legal in the case of legal claims and immunities. It  should now be easier to ask how Feinberg’s and 
Hampton’s analyses vindication can be fitted together.
We begin by trying to apply Feinberg’s idea of rule-vindication to moral rules. On a cognitivist, 
objectivist  view of morality—one which I assume, here—Feinberg’s idea does not  apply to moral rules.59 
Recall that for Feinberg failure to vindicate a law like the law against  murder in Mississippi can allow the 
law to “lose its character as law” (Feinberg, 104). A moral rule, on the view I take, is not the sort of thing 
that can lose its character as a moral rule. The existence or nature of that  moral rule does not depend on 
the mental states of people. Interestingly, the fact that laws can lose their character as laws shows us 
another application of the concept of contradiction. It appears that contradiction can cause a kind of harm, 
insofar as laws’ losing their character as laws can constitute “a disruption of or interference in a person’s 
well-being, including damage to that person’s body, psychological state, capacities to function, life plans, 
or resources over which we take this person to have an entitlement” (Hampton’s definition of harm, on 
1992, 1662).60
 Hampton’s idea about the vindication of moral value, however, can be applied to legally 
significant features. We have already seen that  contradiction of legal claims and immunities can count  as 
denial of the existence of or the importance of legally significant  features and can cause damage to the 
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59 I will not defend this view. I take this view because it makes exposition of the analysis easier at this point. For a 
helpful discussion of cognitivism, non-cognitivism, relativism, objectivism and subjectivism in relation to rights-
theory, see Rainbolt, pages 80 and 81).
60 We must be careful, of course, to distinguish this type of harmful “threat” to the character of laws from “threats” 
posed by legislators, who often quite rightly work to repeal laws. We must also distinguish this type of harmful 
“threat” from “threats” of very similar character—threats to jim crow laws in the U.S. South, for example.
acknowledgement of either the existence or the importance of the legally significant features. Vindication
—especially official reaffirmation—can quite effectively undo damage to the acknowledgement of legally 
significant features, just  as it can in the moral case. In at  least one way, however, Hampton’s idea about 
vindication applies slightly differently in the case of legal claims and immunities. Whereas moral value 
(of the sort under consideration here) can never actually be reduced,61 some legally significant features 
actually can disappear if enough of the right people think they have. So although my being a member of 
the human species cannot be changed by opinion, my U.S. citizenship can. This is because the criteria for 
citizenship are matters of law and can be changed by legislators. Doing away with legally significant 
features, like making laws lose their character as laws, can constitute a kind of harm quite separate from 
the legal injury done through contradiction of the claims or immunities in question. Causing this kind of 
harm is the last way of wronging a claim- or immunity-holder without engaging in violation.
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61 There are, of course, questions the Kantian finds rather irksome having to do with the moral value of the mentally 
disabled (or the person who becomes mentally disabled); but I leave them aside. 
CONCLUSION
 We began with what  I called the puzzle of immunity-violation. If claim-violation is to be the 
paradigm case of violation, then we define violation as acting in a way a claim makes it the case one 
should not act. Or, violation is failing to discharge a duty correlative to a claim. The idea, we saw, was 
that violation was an act of overstepping normative limits imposed by some normative relation between 
people. Immunities, however, like the laws of nature, impose limits that cannot  be overstepped. What  it  is 
for an immunity-relation to exist  is for it to be impossible for some specified person to change another 
specified relation between people. If this normative limit  can be overstepped, then it  seems the limit 
cannot be one imposed by an immunity. When violation occupies a central place in our thinking about 
wrongdoing, it then becomes tempting to conclude that immunities are just not  the sort  of thing that can 
be treated in a way that  wrongs the immunity-holders. This conclusion too, however, is impossible to hold 
on to once one looks to any of the numerous examples of wrongs done through the treatment of 
immunities. I began the essay with the example of Dr. King and an attempt by the City of Birmingham to 
give Dr. King a duty he had an immunity against being given. The concept of immunity, as Edmundson 
shows us, is indispensable when attempting to make sense of free-speech cases. One is forced, then, to 
undertake the search for a way of treating immunities that  is not  violation but that wrongs the immunity-
holders.
 Jean Hampton provides another angle on wrongdoing, one that  allows us to see how immunity-
holders could be wronged through the contradiction of their immunities. For Hampton, the defining 
feature of wrongful acts is their capacity to cause moral injury. Moral injury she defines as damage to a 
person’s value, caused by first  creating the appearance of the person’s degradation. Wrongful acts create 
this appearance of degradation in part  by denying the value generating the person’s entitlements. At  this 
point, I tried to show, among others, Hampton’s analysis is unduly narrow. Hampton seems to assume that 
the denial of the value generating an entitlement and violation of that  entitlement are inter-entailing. 
Rather, I argued, not  all violation constitutes denial of the value generating a person’s entitlements, and 
acts other than violation can constitute denial of the value generating a person’s entitlements. In 
particular, denial of the existence of the entitlement  itself (contradiction of the entitlement) can constitute 
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denial of the value generating the entitlement; and one can contradict  an entitlement both linguistically 
and non-linguistically without ever violating the entitlement. I also introduced an alternative analysis of 
expressive wrongdoing developed by Anderson and Pildes, according to which acts that express wrong 
attitudes about  persons’ value constitute wrongdoing directly; acts that deny the existence of or the 
importance of the value of a person (as do acts of claim-contradiction) are acts that  express wrong 
attitudes about persons’ value. The next step was to show that immunities, like entitlements, could be 
contradicted, and that  immunity-contradiction, like entitlement-contradiction, could constitute denial of 
the value generating the immunity. If immunity-contradiction could constitute denial of the value 
generating the immunity, then immunity-contradiction could constitute wrongdoing (according to the 
Anderson/Pildes analysis) and could cause the appearance of the immunity-holder’s degradation, which in 
turn could cause the immunity-holder moral injury (according to the Hampton analysis).
 The application of the analysis to legal rules revealed two interesting ideas. First, contradiction of 
a legal immunity that (because of relevant  social rules) counts as denying the legally significant  feature 
rooting the immunity (the corollary to the value generating the moral immunity) can, in some 
circumstances, cause the feature to cease to exist. Thus, if the U.S. Government  treats a certain class of 
people as if that  class of people lacks the immunities and claims guaranteed them as citizens, they 
eventually lose their citizenship status under the law. Likewise, contradiction of a legal immunity that 
(because of relevant social rules) counts as denying the legal rule that  secures the immunity to the 
immunity-holder because of the immunity-holder’s legally significant features can, in some 
circumstances, cause the rule in question to atrophy and, eventually, to cease to exist. Judges and juries in 
the American South who refused to indict  or convict  white murderers of black people undermined the 
status of murder laws insofar as they applied to black people.
 If we return, again to the comparison between immunities and natural laws, we see that they 
differ on this point. The character of the laws of nature as laws of nature is never undermined by human 
action or belief. Similarly, the character of moral immunities as moral immunities is never undermined by 
human action or belief. Legal immunities, however, are possible to undermine. One might  characterize 
legal immunities, then, as social images of certain moral and natural laws. The parallel between them is 
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not perfect, but  wrongful ways of treating moral and legal immunities, at  least, can be fruitfully analyzed 
together.
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